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Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global 
Theater: Emerging Complexities of 
Transborder Expression 
Timothy Zick 65 Vand. L. Rev. 125 (2012) 
We have entered an era in which potentially harmful 
expression can be distributed around the world in an instant. In the 
emerging global theater, speakers and audiences are connected 
through new and proliferating media; communicative space and 
time are compressed to an extraordinary degree; domestic expression 
can implicate national security and foreign affairs concerns; and a 
new model of global information dissemination is developing in 
which speakers are sometimes located beyond the jurisdiction of 
nations that may be harmed by their communications and 
disclosures. 
This Article examines the First Amendment complexities 
associated with the dissemination of potentially harmful 
information in the global theater. These complexities include global 
dissemination of offensive expression, incitement to unlawful 
activities abroad, enemy-aiding expression that crosses territorial 
borders, and global free press concerns. The author argues that 
traditional First Amendment doctrines and principles ought 
generally to apply in the global theater. Reliance on marketplace 
and self-governance principles, application of speech-protective 
incitement standards, and continued support for an expansive and 
robust conception of press freedoms will preserve transborder First 
Amendment liberties in the digital era and allow the global theater 
to develop and mature. The author urges government officials not to 
react to potentially dangerous global theater expression by adopting 
new restrictions on transborder expressive and associational 
activities; creating new criminal offenses that inhibit transborder 
information flow; establishing broad penalties relating to 
transborder commingling and association; resorting to extrajudicial 
and potentially extralegal penalties for dangerous speakers; or 
imposing new limits on press freedoms. 
In addition to these specific First Amendment issues, the 
Article also discusses several broader concerns relating to the 
development of the global theater. The author contends that in the 
global theater era, it will be critically important to the protection of 
speech and press liberties that officials and courts act with due 
regard for the First Amendment's transborder dimension. Moreover, 
in the global theater, First Amendment justifications should be 
interpreted to encompass global information flow, cross-border 
collaboration, and the global spread of democratic principles. More 
attention must also be paid to the unique legal, professional, ethical, 
and identity challenges the press will face in the global theater. 
Finally, the author urges that more careful legal and scholarly 
attention be given to new restrictions on global information flow, 
including actions of private intermediaries and nonconventional 
forms of government censorship. 
Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global 
Theater: Emerging Complexities of 
Transborder Expression 
Timothy Zick* 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 126 
I. THE EMERGING GLOBAL THEATER ..................................... 131 
A. Interconnectivity .................................................... 132 
B. The Compression of Space and Time ...................... 133 
C. Domestic Expression, National Security, and 
Foreign Affairs ....................................................... 135 
D. New Regulatory Challenges in the Emerging 
Global Theater ....................................................... 137 
II. DANGEROUS EXPRESSION IN THE GLOBAL THEATER ........... 139 
A. Breaches of Global Peace and Order ....................... 140 
1. Transborder Offense and Hostile 
Audience Reaction ....................................... 140 
2. Trans border Incitement .............................. 146 
B. Enemy-Aiding Expression ...................................... 154 
1. A Basic Definition ....................................... 154 
2. Domestic Rhetoric, Symbolism, and 
Dissent ........................................................ 155 
3. Providing "Material Support" to 
Foreign Terrorists ....................................... 157 
4. Cybertreason ............................................... 164 
C. The Distribution of Government Secrets in the 
Global Theater ....................................................... 169 
Ill. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE GLOBAL THEATER ............. 174 
A. The First Amendment's 
Trans border Dimension ......................................... 17 4 
B. Fundamental First Amendment Values in the 
Global Theater ....................................................... 177 
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School I would like to thank Lily Macartney for 
her invaluable research assistance. 
125 
126 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1:125 
C. Freedom of the Press in the 
Global Theater ....................................................... 180 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 186 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Holmes once wrote, "The most stringent protection of 
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a 
theatre and causing a panic."1 As recent events have demonstrated, 
the geographic contours of that theater have expanded beyond U.S. 
territorial borders. Owing to globalization, digitization of expression, 
and other forces, the world has become increasingly interconnected. 
The global soapbox the Supreme Court alluded to in 1997, when 
striking down Congress's first attempt to restrict speech on the 
Internet, has now materialized in the United States and abroad. 2 
Speakers' voices and the physical and psychological effects of domestic 
expressive activities now frequently traverse or transcend territorial 
borders. 
As Holmes indicated in the same passage quoted above, "[T]he 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is 
done."3 Consider in that light the circumstances of the following recent 
events, which highlight some of the First Amendment complexities 
associated with the emerging global theater: 
• A pastor from Gainesville, Florida, threatened to burn 
copies of the Koran to mark the anniversary of the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. As a result, 
President Obama, among other high-level officials, 
called on the pastor to desist. 4 Several people in 
Mghanistan, who had heard of the pastor's plans, 
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
2. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850, 868, 870, 885 (1997) (describing the Internet as "a 
unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication" and a "new marketplace of 
ideas" containing "vast democratic forums" from which "any person with a phone line can become 
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox"). 
3. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
4. Damien Cave & Anne Barnard, Minister Wavers on Plans to Burn Koran, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2010, at A3; Jack Healy & Steven Erlanger, Planned Koran Burning Drew 
International Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/world/ 
10react.html?scp=1&sq=Planned%20Koran%20Burning"/o20Drew%20International%20Scorn&st 
=nyt&pagewanted=l. 
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protested and died during the ensuing riots. 5 When the 
pastor later followed through and burned a copy of the 
Koran, several more people died abroad.6 
• Mter posting a satirical poster on the web urging 
readers to participate in "Everybody Draw Mohammed 
Day," a Seattle-based cartoonist received foreign death 
threats and was forced into hiding.7 
• As a result of the Supreme Court ruling in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, U.S. citizens who file 
petitions with the United Nations on behalf of, provide 
legal training to, or even post supportive material on the 
web about designated "foreign terrorist organizations" 
may be prosecuted under federal laws prohibiting the 
prov1s10n of "material support" to terrorists. 8 
Additionally, individuals undertaking these actions 
could also be subject to prosecution for treason.9 
• Mter a radical Muslim cleric named Anwar Al-Aulaqi, 
who was a U.S. citizen residing in Yemen, posted 
several videos and speeches on the Internet that praised 
and encouraged terrorist attacks in the United States 
and abroad, YouTube removed some of the cleric's 
videos from its site and the Obama Administration 
targeted him for execution. (The cleric was recently 
killed in a drone strike.)10 
5. Rod Nordland, 2 Afghans Are Killed in Protests over Koran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2010, 
at All (reporting that five people had been killed in Afghanistan during protests of the proposed 
Koran burning in Florida). 
6. Taimoor Shah & Rod Nordland, Afghans Protest Koran Burning for Third Day, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A5. 
7. Brian Stelter, Cartoonist in Hiding After Death Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2010, at 
A14. 
8. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
9. Id. 
10. A federal judge dismissed a lawsuit filed by the cleric's father challenging the targeted 
killing of his son on standing and other justiciability grounds. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). Al-Aulaqi was killed on September 30, 2011, as a result of an American drone 
attack in Yemen. Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born 
Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at Al. 
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• Mter Julian Assange, the publisher of the foreign 
website WikiLeaks, shared classified documents 
concerning American military operations in Iraq and 
Mghanistan and American diplomatic cables with 
several Western news outlets and posted them on the 
Internet, U.S. officials suggested that he should be 
treated as a terrorist or prosecuted under the Espionage 
Act of 1917.11 
As the proposed Koran-burning episode shows, domestic speech 
can have instantaneous and even deadly international effects. 
Further, as the Seattle cartoonist learned, U.S. residents who post 
messages on the Internet must now consider not only the possibility of 
domestic hecklers but foreign ones as well. 12 In the emerging global 
theater, speech and association that originates inside the United 
States but crosses territorial borders may cause violence in distant 
locations, upset delicate foreign policy objectives and relationships, 
and aid foreign enemies. All of this may occur without the speaker 
ever departing from his location or even leaving his desk. Foreign 
speakers, including U.S. citizens traveling or residing abroad, may 
direct enemy-aiding expression to all corners of the globe via the 
Internet. Finally, as the WikiLeaks episode demonstrates, once 
confidential state information has leaked across territorial borders, 
efforts to control its global distribution will prove substantially more 
difficult, if not futile. 
Traditional First Amendment doctrines and jurisprudence did 
not develop in a global theater. Rather, they developed in a domestic 
sphere in which expression and its effects stayed largely within 
territorial borders. The distribution of potentially harmful expression 
in the global theater raises important and unresolved questions. Can 
the government prosecute a domestic speaker for inciting a riot half a 
world away? If the answer depends, as Justice Holmes indicated, on 
matters of "proximity and degree," how should courts and 
commentators analyze those characteristics in the twenty-first 
century's digital age?13 If hecklers thousands of miles away can chill 
speakers in the United States, what are the implications for domestic-
speech marketplaces and the ability of citizens to communicate via 
11. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but Legal Scholars 
Warn of Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A18 (discussing the possibility that the 
Justice Department will prosecute Julian Assange). 
12. See J. David Goodman, Syrian Activists Abroad Speak of Retaliation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
2011, at A10 (reporting that the State Department is investigating allegations that the Syrian 
government has intimidated and harassed activists living in the United States). 
13. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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global networks? Are citizens who merely advocate in favor of 
terrorism or support terrorist organizations by publishing favorable 
commentary about them on the web subject to criminal prosecution for 
providing material support to terrorists? Are they subject to criminal 
prosecution for treason?14 To what extent will citizens' First 
Amendment liberties actually be protected when they speak from 
distant locations? Are foreign publishers subject to U.S. espionage and 
other national security laws? If so, might the First Amendment's free 
speech and press guarantees also protect them? 
Speakers and officials will have to grapple with these and other 
questions in the emerging global theater. More broadly, our society 
will have to pay much closer attention to the First Amendment's 
relationship to transborder expression. In the emerging global theater, 
long-standing domestic commitments to marketplace and 
counterspeech principles, as well as old-fashioned principles of 
speaker fortitude, will be severely tested by changed expressive 
conditions and new regulatory challenges. Courts will have to consider 
legal and constitutional conceptions (e.g., incitement, hostile 
audiences, treason, and terrorism) in light of, and in some cases 
adapted to, the unique circumstances of the global theater. Further, 
regulatory challenges presented by the transborder distribution of 
potentially harmful expression will test the government's 
commitments to both the freedoms of speech and press and to the rule 
of law. As the potential harm from transborder speech and association 
increases, governments will seek new means of control. New forms of 
speech regulation, censorship, and civil disobedience will arise in the 
emerging global theater. 
This Article examines some of the constitutional and regulatory 
complexities that have emerged in the global theater. Part I briefly 
describes the characteristics of the new expressive environment, with 
a particular focus on potentially harmful speech in the global theater. 
Although globalization, interconnectivity, and the compression of 
space and time will facilitate speech, press, and associationalliberties, 
these global theater characteristics will also produce substantial risks 
for governments and their citizens. 
Part II analyzes some of the free speech, association, and press 
issues that have already arisen or are likely to arise in the global 
14. See Tom W. Bell, Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 999, 
1027-28 (2005) (observing that the law of treason has developed such that a broad category of 
enemy-aiding expression might be deemed treasonous); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: 
Generally Applicable Laws, illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the 
Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1341-42 (2005) (discussing the potential application 
of treason law to antiwar and other speech that could aid enemies of the United States). 
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theater. My particular focus will be on expression and association that 
may lead to harmful transborder effects. I will make four general 
claims. First, although in rare instances the government could punish 
domestic incitement despite its distant effects, expression that 
breaches global peace or order by producing extraterritorial offense 
and other harmful effects ought generally to remain fully protected in 
the global theater. Second, the instantaneous transborder flow of 
offensive speech will place additional burdens on both speakers and 
authorities. As a result, speakers will have to more carefully assess in 
advance whether they will risk the possibility of harm from distant 
threats, and officials ought (in some cases) to be prepared to offer 
reasonable protection to offensive domestic speakers who are faced 
with threats from foreign hecklers. Third, it is critical that legislatures 
and courts define the expanding category of proscribed enemy-aiding 
expression, which now includes providing "material support" to 
terrorists in the form of legitimizing and supportive communications 
as well as cybertreason as narrowly as possible. In general, the United 
States should draft and enforce national security laws such that 
intentional enemy-aiding conduct, rather than speech, is proscribed. 
Fourth, with regard to the transborder exposure of governmental 
secrets, the United States ought to focus primarily upon improving its 
processes for protecting secrecy rather than on prosecuting the 
publishers, whether foreign or domestic, of confidential or secret 
governmental information. 
Part III draws more general First Amendment lessons from 
recent global theater controversies. In the emerging global theater, it 
is critical that courts, officials, and commentators begin to think more 
systematically about transborder speech, association, and press 
concerns. U.S. policymakers, litigants, and scholars must incorporate 
the First Amendment's transborder dimension into political, legal, and 
constitutional discussions regarding global information flow in the 
twenty-first century. As our society maps the First Amendment's 
transborder dimension, America's exceptional regard for offensive 
expression is likely to come under increasing challenges at home and 
abroad. We will thus have to explain, and likely defend, our long-
standing free speech principles and values to both domestic and global 
audiences. But we need not abandon traditional First Amendment 
commitments in response to the potential dangers of transborder 
expression and association. Indeed, recent episodes have confirmed 
that core First Amendment principles, including marketplace 
justifications for free speech, remain critically important in the 
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emerging global theater. 15 There are also various lessons for the press, 
an institution that is likely to continue its transformation from a 
domestic information hub to a loosely bound international distribution 
network. As this transformation occurs, the press will need to be more 
circumspect in its reporting on matters of global concern. As new 
sources and publishers, operating on different models and in pursuit 
of different missions, continue to materialize, they will test the press's 
commitment to the free flow of information. Finally, new threats to 
free speech and information flow will arise in the global theater. As 
recent global theater controversies indicate, we ought to pay more 
attention to private intermediaries and the extent to which they can 
disrupt the transborder flow of information. We should also be mindful 
of the effects that new forms of governmental information control, 
such as prosecution of information distributors and extrajudicial 
targeted killing, may have on transborder information flow. 
I. THE EMERGING GLOBAL THEATER 
Global channels of speech, press, and association have become 
tightly interconnected.l6 Globalization, digitization, and the 
proliferation of media outlets blur the lines between domestic- and 
foreign-speech marketplaces. At home, abroad, and in cyberspace, 
citizens increasingly participate in global debates and enter 
relationships with aliens who are located abroad. The full implications 
of this emerging global theater are beyond the scope of this Article. My 
more modest goal in Parts I and II is to focus on the basic 
characteristics and complexities of this emerging global marketplace, 
particularly as they relate to potentially harmful forms of expression 
and association. Part III addresses some of the broader lessons that 
have emerged from early events in the global theater. 
15. The marketplace idea or metaphor is generally thought to have originated in the work 
of John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) 
(1859). For elaborations of the metaphor, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J ., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market.") and ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 559-66 (1969). 
16. See, e.g., DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
CYBERSPACE 90-99 (2009) (discussing Internet and network connectivity); Usage and Population 
Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2011) (collecting worldwide Internet usage statistics). 
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A. Interconnectiuity 
Global interconnectivity is the defining characteristic of free 
speech, press, and association in the twenty-first century.17 A speaker 
who intends to, or appears to, address a small local community may in 
fact speak to a global audience. Further, people around the globe can 
feel, sometimes instantaneously, the tangible and psychological effects 
of domestic speech and association. Of course, cross-border 
communication flows into the United States as well. In many 
instances, this occurs with the same relative ease and through the 
same or similar channels of communication. 
Several factors have contributed to an emerging global 
expressive theater.l8 These include the proliferation of media outlets; 
expanded access to global communications networks; the 
characteristics of modern media and news cycles-in particular the 
penchant for focusing intensely on controversial statements or events 
to the near-exclusion of all else; the ability to easily and cheaply store, 
link to, and distribute digitized material and archives; and shared 
language capabilities. 
These forces have significantly blurred traditional lines 
between domestic- and foreign-speech marketplaces. Owing to 
transborder communications networks, domestic speakers and foreign 
audiences are connected as never before. This connectivity is often 
touted as a positive characteristic of the contemporary marketplace of 
ideas-and it is. Among other things, global interconnectivity has the 
potential to expose people to distant cultures; to broaden political, 
scientific, and cultural fields of inquiry and debate; and to expand 
opportunities for transborder association and collaboration. In terms 
of free speech, these connections facilitate self-governance on a global 
scale. They also contribute to a vigorous exchange of ideas in global 
forums. As Jack Balkin observed, because interconnectivity expands 
opportunities for public participation in creative and other endeavors 
17. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. 
L. REV. 427 (2009). 
18. To be clear, I am not claiming that a global marketplace of ideas presently exists. 
Repressive regimes and other limitations obviously prevent such a marketplace from fully 
forming and functioning. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 92-95 (2006) (discussing Chinese Internet filtering 
technologies). Rather, my claim is that transborder information flow is creating a global 
marketplace in which more and more of the world's population may participate. See RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 352 (1992) (suggesting that "the new technologies 
that increasingly knit the globe into one giant electronic village will tend to create an 
international marketplace for free speech"). 
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it may ultimately lead to the spread of "democratic culture."19 From a 
cosmopolitan perspective, these are all positive developments. 
However, we must also recognize the potential harms that 
might attend interconnectivity. One frequently noted adverse effect is 
the proliferation of hate speech and advocacy of violence, particularly 
on the Internet.2o Governments will have a difficult time effectively 
regulating this sort of potentially harmful expression in the global 
theater. Nations differ with regard to the extent of protection afforded 
such expression.21 Receiving nations that do not provide protection for 
hate speech, constitutionally or otherwise, cannot always intercept or 
suppress hateful expression that crosses the border from a nation in 
which such speech is constitutionally protected.22 Thus, for example, 
protected hate speech hosted on a U.S. website may be simultaneously 
available in France and Germany, countries that prohibit distribution 
of such material.23 Moreover, in some cases speakers will be able to 
hide their locations and identities from authorities. In general, 
harmful expression will flow freely across borders in the global 
theater. 
B. The Compression of Space and Time 
One particular complexity related to harmful transborder 
expression is that the elements of communicative space and time are 
compressed. Speech that originates inside the United States may 
quickly inflame passions in communities across the globe. Whereas it 
used to take days, weeks, or even longer for a local event or statement 
to have any impact beyond U.S. borders, in the emerging global 
theater worldwide exposure and reaction are sometimes 
instantaneous. In the digital age, audiences need not be physically 
present to be instantly aware of, or even psychologically affected or 
inflamed by, communications originating thousands of miles away. 
Under these circumstances, it is possible that a domestic speaker 
19. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-6, 34-38 (2004}. 
20. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 818-20 (2001}. 
21. See id. at 858-63 (discussing approaches to Internet hate speech in various western 
democracies). 
22. See id. at 858-59 (noting, in particular, that the United States' protection of hateful 
expression complicates other nations' efforts to regulate it). 
23. In such circumstances, it may not even be clear which nation's laws apply to the speech 
in question. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 
1217 (9th Cir. 2006) (addressing the enforceability of a French judgment ordering a U.S. website 
to prevent the display of Nazi memorabilia for sale in France). 
134 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1:125 
could incite a riot or successfully precipitate imminent violence across 
the globe. 
Owing to the compression of space and time, seemingly local 
and provincial concerns can immediately become topics of global 
interest. The plan to burn the Koran produced not just a local and 
national reaction, but an international debate regarding tolerance for 
hateful speech and the power of governments to proscribe deeply 
offensive expression. Opposition to the proposed construction of an 
Islamic center blocks from Ground Zero in Manhattan (the so-called 
"Ground Zero Mosque") was reported and commented upon by both 
domestic and international news outlets.24 In the global theater, with 
its transborder media amplifier, local events may garner a level of 
attention that is disproportionate to their actual significance. 
Although foreigners may have no tangible or political connection to an 
issue, incendiary local expression may quickly become a matter of 
concern to a global audience. 
Many audiences live in places that do not embrace America's 
exceptional protection for hateful, offensive, and other harmful forms 
of expression. The compression of space and time may leave little 
opportunity for speakers to soberly reflect on the messages they 
convey. Moreover, although many speakers and audiences in the 
global theater share a common language, the danger of mistranslation 
and misunderstanding is unfortunately quite real. Depending to some 
degree on the nature of national and international media coverage, 
foreign audiences might mistakenly assume that noisy domestic 
opposition to something like a proposed Islamic center communicates 
the sentiments of the public at large or even the U.S. government. 
Communications via transborder networks will lead to more frequent 
24. See, e.g., Gary Bauer, Ground Zero Mosque Would Embolden Our Enemy, HUMAN 
EVENTS, Aug. 8, 2010, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38445#; Brian Montopoli, 
"Ground Zero Mosque" Developer Sharif El-Gamal: No Money from Iran, Hamas, 
CBSNEWS.COM, Aug. 27, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20014959-
503544.html; Jillian Scharr, Jewish Leaders Gather to Support Ground Zero Mosque, NBC N.Y., 
Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/newsllocal-beat/Jewish-Leaders-Gather-to-Support-
Ground-Zero-Mosque-100049479.html; Tom Topousis, Landmark Vote on Ground Zero Mosque, 
N.Y. POST, Aug. 3, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattanllandmark_vote_on_ 
ground_zero_mosque_7iWKADGQOOhZKHkpSdxYWN; Erica Werner, Obama Backs Mosque 
Near Ground Zero, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 14, 2010, 
http://www.independent.co.uklnews/world!americaslobama-backs-mosque-near-ground-zero-
2052608.html. Reaction in a variety of Arab news outlets is reported in Catherine Dagger, The 
Ground Zero Mosque-What the Arab Press is Saying About the Ground Zero Mosque 
Controversy, AsSOCIATED CONTENT, Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.associatedcontent.com/ 
article/5706656/the_ground_zero_mosque_what_the_arab.html?cat=54 and in What the Arab 
Papers Say, ECONOMIST ONLINE, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbookl 
2010/08/arab _reactions_cordoba_mosque. 
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global culture clashes. Some of these controversies will result in 
violent, or even deadly, reactions from foreign audiences. 
C. Domestic Expression, National Security, and Foreign Affairs 
One of the consequences of interconnectivity and the 
compression of space and time is the increased potential for domestic 
expression to affect the Global War on Terror and foreign affairs. 
Again, this is a product of the blurring of traditional territorial lines 
between domestic- and foreign-speech marketplaces. 
In the United States, political pundits and commentators 
across the political spectrum often articulate some version of the 
following argument: ''Your speech will embolden our enemies, harm 
our troops, undermine national interests abroad, or legitimize 
terrorism."25 Some commentators and editorialists even press the 
point further, arguing that some forms of domestic political dissent 
and protest are themselves treasonous.26 In the global theater, even 
the most provincial conflicts can quickly give rise to charges of 
providing aid to foreign terrorist organizations or even treason. Thus, 
domestic proponents of the Islamic center in Manhattan charged 
opponents with aiding terrorists or harming American troops in 
foreign locations by voicing anti-Islamic sentiments likely to reach 
foreign audiences.27 In the global theater, such charges may 
proliferate. 
Of course, most-if not all-claims that such speech is 
treasonous can be dismissed as pure political rhetoric or hyperbole; 
overblown and baseless charges of treasonous speech and association 
are hardly new in American politics. Throughout our history, domestic 
protest and offensive speech have always posed some indeterminate 
threat to foreign military operations and foreign relations. In the pre-
global-theater era, the claim that domestic political speech would 
actually provide some concrete or meaningful assistance to foreign 
enemies seemed in most cases to be farfetched. But, as the examples 
25. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 24 (claiming that building the proposed Islamic center in 
lower Manhattan would "embolden our enemy"); Editorial, Why President Obama Should Meet 
with Dick Cheney, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/04/why-
president-obama-should-meet-with-dick-cheney.html (suggesting that former Vice President 
Cheney's criticisms of President Obama were harming national security). 
26. See, e.g., Editorial, Comfort and the Protesters, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 6, 2003, http://www. 
nysun.com/editorials/comfort-and-the-protesters/77452/ (suggesting that antiwar protesters 
might be guilty of treason). 
27. See, e.g., Joshua Holland, Anti-Mosque Organizers Giving Aid and Comfort to the 
Enemy, ALTERNET.ORG (Aug. 31, 2010, 9:45AM), http:/lblogs.alternet.org/speakeasy/2010/08/31/ 
anti-mosque-organizers-are-giving-aid-and-comfort-to-the-enemy/. 
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discussed so far suggest, we have entered an era in which domestic 
political speech and association may be perceived as posing a threat to 
national security. Such concerns may be more difficult to dismiss in 
the global-theater era. 
As noted, communications in the global theater traverse 
international borders with relative frequency and ease. They are more 
likely to reach terrorists and other enemies abroad, in forms that are 
useful to those individuals. Thus, a video file of a domestic protest in 
the United States can easily become a hyperlink on a foreign 
terrorist's website, providing a form of immediate aid in terms of 
recruitment and communication. In a similar fashion, enemy forces in 
the field might download a digitized file of confidential information 
from the Internet. Access to this sort of information could indeed 
increase the potential for harm to U.S. troops and assets both on 
distant military battlefields and in other foreign locations. Thus, in an 
extraordinary (perhaps unprecedented) gesture, President Obama 
warned that a Florida pastor's plans to burn a Koran would be a 
"recruitment bonanza for Al Qaeda" and could "greatly endanger our 
young men and women in uniform who are in Iraq, who are in 
Mghanistan."28 
Similarly, robust and heated domestic communications might 
have an effect on foreign relations. In addition to speaking out publicly 
about the Florida pastor's plans, President Obama also voiced support 
for a developer's right to build an Islamic center in Manhattan.29 
President Obama directed his statements not merely to restive 
domestic audiences, but also to various foreign audiences who were 
paying close attention to events in lower Manhattan. In the global 
theater, presidents and other officials will likely feel pressed, as 
President Obama apparently did, to denounce extremist views in 
order to assure global audiences, including international leaders, that 
the United States is committed to universal values of dignity, 
tolerance, and equality. 
Moreover, in the emerging global theater, U.S. citizens will 
increasingly seek to engage and participate in transborder association 
and collaboration. Typical transborder contacts will range from 
commercial ventures, to humanitarian relief projects, to collaborations 
within established international human rights institutions and 
communities. These contacts will create opportunities for the 
trans border sharing of information and viewpoints. 
28. Cave & Barnard, supra note 4. 
29. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Strongly Backs Islam Center Near 9111 Site, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 14, 2010, at AI. 
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However, there is a potentially dangerous side to these 
transborder contacts. Some may be criminal enterprises or violent 
conspiracies. Of course, this is also true of some purely domestic or 
intraterritorial associations and collaborations. Under a provincial 
interpretation of the First Amendment, transborder collaboration is 
treated as presumptively suspect. In part, this relates to the foreign 
affairs and national security concerns discussed above.30 In the global 
theater, the government may seek to rely upon foreign affairs and 
national security concerns to restrict any domestic speech or 
association that Congress and/or the State Department believe could 
negatively affect relationships with U.S. allies. 
D. New Regulatory Challenges in the Emerging Global Theater 
The emerging global theater will create substantial regulatory 
challenges insofar as harmful speech and association are concerned. 
Citizens located within the United States and abroad will have more 
opportunities to propagandize and otherwise aid foreign enemies 
through communications distributed on the Internet. The frequency, 
substance, and potential harmful effects of these communications will 
challenge a government's commitment to traditional free speech 
principles in the emerging global theater. In many cases, 
interconnectivity and digitization will render efforts to suppress 
harmful expression, including closely guarded government secrets, 
futile. 
In the predigital era, a citizen who wished to effectively 
propagandize on behalf of a foreign enemy generally had to travel 
abroad in order to use the enemy's dedicated channels of 
communication.31 Today, these citizens can access shared networks 
from anywhere in the world. In the global theater, citizens do not need 
to leave the country, or even their living rooms, to actively 
propagandize on behalf of an enemy or provide material support to a 
foreign terrorist group. Further, citizens who wish to distribute 
harmful information to American or international enemies are no 
longer limited to press conferences, face-to-face meetings, and other 
methods likely to reach relatively limited domestic and foreign 
30. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (upholding 
"material-support" laws as applied to transborder collaboration, based in part on foreign affairs 
and national security concerns). 
31. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1007 (noting that in several World War II-era treason cases, 
defendants "had to travel overseas and use the radio broadcasting facilities of U.S. enemies to 
reach the audiences they targeted, whether U.S. armed forces abroad or the masses back home"). 
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audiences.32 With access to the Internet, citizens at home and abroad 
can threaten U.S. interests by posting speeches, videos, and other 
information to global information networks. 
One of the most pressing challenges to governmental 
regulation of transborder information flow in the global theater 
concerns the publication of government secrets.33 From his base in 
Switzerland, WikiLeaks' publisher, Julian Assange, shared diplomatic 
cables and detailed information regarding U.S. battlefield operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan with several western newspapers. 34 Assange, 
who allegedly obtained the information from a private in the U.S. 
Army (who himself allegedly procured the information illegally and is 
being prosecuted by the U.S. government for his actions), posted some 
of the material on the WikiLeaks website.35 According to the U.S. 
Department of Defense, some of this information may have 
compromised military missions and covert agents working in the 
field. 36 The White House and State Department decried the release of 
diplomatic cables, suggesting that the disclosures endangered 
diplomatic relations and lives. 37 Subsequently, the U.S. Justice 
Department opened a criminal investigation targeting Assange and 
WikiLeaks. 38 
As the WikiLeaks episode shows, anyone with an Internet 
connection and access to secret or confidential information can cheaply 
and widely distribute this information. Technological channels of 
communication not subject to direct control by U.S. officials are 
rapidly replacing traditional transborder information platforms like 
the U.S. Mail and other heavily regulated telecommunications outlets. 
This raises additional regulatory complexities, particularly where 
foreign actors have breached governmental secrecy and information 
has traversed international borders and appeared on the Internet. In 
the global theater, damaging information does not simply disappear 
32. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1981) (describing a U.S. citizen's public 
overseas campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency). 
33. See Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at WK1 
(discussing government efforts to protect secrets in the modern age). 
34. Scott Shane, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2010, at Al. 
35. Elisabeth Bumiller, Army Broadens Inquiry Into WikiLeaks Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 31, 2010, at A4. 
36. See The Defense Department's Response, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at A9. 
37. Ginger Thompson, Officials Assail WikiLeaks and Try to Curb Damage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2010, http://query.nytimes.com/gstlfullpage.html?res=9COCEODA1331F93AA15752 
C1A9669D8B63&scp=1&sq=Officials%20Assail%20WikiLeaks%20and%20Try"/o20to%20Curb%2 
ODamage&st=cse. 
38. See Savage, supra note 11. 
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and often cannot be destroyed. Rather, the information and raw data 
are likely to survive on mirror sites and in encrypted files that the 
government cannot access or regulate.39 Once someone posts 
information on the web, it may be impossible to prevent others from 
copying and distributing it. Criminal prosecution may deter future 
leakers or publishers, but it will not cure the damage from disclosure 
or ensure that the information is scrubbed from the global record. 
In the global theater, it will be more difficult for the 
government to control or regulate citizens' transborder speech and 
association activities. Acute regulatory problems may arise when 
citizens convey potentially harmful messages from beyond U.S. 
borders. In an appropriate case, the government might revoke a 
citizen's passport based upon harmful speech or speech activities 
abroad.40 However, traditional means of regulation will likely be 
ineffectual when applied to a citizen dedicated to harming the United 
States from beyond its borders. 
Thus, officials will seek new regulatory methods in an effort to 
stem the flow of harmful expression, including terrorist expression. 
For example, federal officials have pressured domestic Internet 
intermediaries to remove alleged terrorist expression and sensitive 
government reports from their servers. Federal prosecutors may seek 
indictments against domestic- or foreign-information distributors. As 
noted earlier, in at least one instance, President Obama issued an 
order targeting an American citizen for execution based in part on 
incendiary Internet posts advocating terrorist violence in the U.S. and 
abroad.41 We could now be witnessing the beginning of a 
transformation from a regulatory model, which is based upon state 
prosecution and punishment of harmful acts and expression, to a 
model that relies upon suppression by private intermediaries, 
punishment of information distributors, and extrajudicial killings. 
II. DANGEROUS EXPRESSION IN THE GLOBAL THEATER 
A number of free speech, association, and press issues will 
arise as foreign and domestic speakers transmit harmful expression in 
the emerging global theater. This Part considers the application of 
First Amendment doctrines and principles relating to harmful 
39. See Ravi Somaiya, Hundreds of WikiLeaks Mirror Sites Appear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 
2010, at A12. 
40. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (upholding the revocation of a citizen's 
passport based in part on the nature of his overseas expression). 
41. See Mazzetti, Schmitt & Worth, supra note 10 (describing background relating to 
President Obama's decision to order a targeted killing). 
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expression in the global theater. Specifically, I will address the 
following threats to global public order: offensive and incendiary 
domestic expression; "enemy-aiding'' expression; and the global 
distribution of confidential government information. In most 
instances, courts can readily adapt existing First Amendment 
doctrines and principles to new circumstances in order to address 
some of these issues. In other contexts, however, the fit may not be as 
seamless. In those instances, courts and other officials will have to 
consider how to shape and interpret our First Amendment in the 
global theater. Part III moves from these doctrinal concerns to some 
broader themes or lessons regarding the development of the global 
theater. 
A. Breaches of Global Peace and Order 
In the emerging global theater, there is an increased likelihood 
that domestic speech, some of which was originally intended solely for 
domestic audiences, will produce extraterritorial psychological and 
physical harm. As explained in Part I, local disputes may well be 
flashpoints for global riots and other conflicts. Courts and 
commentators have not yet considered how the First Amendment will 
apply to breaches of global, as opposed to purely local, peace and 
order. This Section addresses First Amendment doctrines as they 
relate to transborder offense, hostile foreign audiences, and 
transborder incitement. 
1. Transborder Offense and Hostile Audience Reaction 
Under settled First Amendment doctrine, mere offensiveness is 
not a proper ground for regulating or suppressing a speaker's 
message.42 As mentioned earlier, the stakes associated with 
transborder offense could be substantially higher than those 
associated with offensive speech confined to localities or domestic 
territorial boundaries. Foreign audience reactions to offensive 
domestic expression could include deadly riots and may otherwise 
implicate foreign affairs and national security concerns. The central 
question is as follows: Should these circumstances produce some 
fundamental change regarding the First Amendment's treatment of 
offensive domestic expression? For a number of reasons, that question 
ought to be answered in the negative. 
42. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (invalidating a breach-of-peace 
conviction based on the wearing of an offensive jacket in a courthouse corridor). 
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Consider, for example, the Koran burning that occurred in 
Gainesville, Florida. In the United States, a speaker can generally 
convey a message by burning items, such as the national flag, a draft 
card, or a cross.43 The government may regulate or prohibit these and 
other forms of expressive or symbolic conduct in only two relatively 
narrow circumstances: If the burning of the object conveys an 
unprotected message of some sort, such as a true threat, then it may 
be subject to sanction.44 It would also be appropriate and 
constitutional for local authorities to require a permit or otherwise 
insist that the Koran burning comply with content-neutral public 
order and safety laws.45 However, governments may not prohibit 
expressive activity just because the message's content is offensive or 
otherwise disapproved of.46 The mere fact that the burning of an item 
expresses disdain for the United States, disagreement with national 
policies or leaders, or even the toxic notion of white supremacy is not, 
without more, a valid ground for prohibiting the expressive act.47 
These fundamental principles would apply to the burning of 
sacred religious texts (e.g., the Bible, the Koran, or the Torah).48 Thus, 
the government cannot impose a sanction merely because the message 
was intended to, or would in fact, offend a substantial number of 
people in the local community, the state, or the nation. Nor would the 
mere possibility that a local audience might react violently to this 
form of expression, or suffer psychological discomfort as a result of it, 
provide any valid ground for suppressing the symbolic act. 49 
43. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (cross burning); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377 (1992) (cross burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of draft card). 
44. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (noting that some cross burnings may be punished as 
true threats). 
45. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
46. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 385 ("[N]onverbal expressive activity can be banned because of 
the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses .... "). 
47. This conclusion is obviously based upon current First Amendment doctrine. Some 
commentators might argue that such hateful speech, whether directed at domestic or foreign 
audiences, ought to be proscribed. Cf. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets, And Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982). 
48. Although this is long-settled doctrine, some U.S. commentators nevertheless suggested 
that Pastor Jones might be arrested for his symbolic act. See, e.g., Patrick J. Buchanan, The 
Bonfire of the Qurans, VDARE.COM (Sept. 9, 2010), http://vdare.com/buchanan/100909 
_qurans.htm (suggesting that President Obama send marshals to arrest Pastor Jones); M.J. 
Rosenberg, Can Feds Just Arrest the Quran Burner?, THE BUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://www .huffingtonpost.com/mj-rosenberg/can -feds-just-arrest-the_b_710894.html (asking 
whether federal authorities could arrest Pastor Jones). 
49. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) 
("undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" is not sufficient to overcome the right of 
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As the Koran burning demonstrates, in the global theater, 
speakers will frequently convey offensive and incendiary expression 
across vast distances and to foreign audiences. Some expression that 
originates in the United States will inevitably deeply offend or even 
psychologically harm many members of those audiences. Some foreign 
listeners or viewers will react violently to domestic expression, as 
many Mghans did when they learned of the planned and later 
executed Koran burning. so 
However, the mere fact that some portion of a worldwide 
audience might experience some offense or psychological discomfort as 
a result of, or even engage in rioting in response to, an act of domestic 
expression is not a valid basis for restricting or proscribing the 
message.51 The principles of the speech marketplace should apply 
wherever the speech is distributed. Thus, foreign audiences, like 
domestic ones, should be encouraged to engage in counterspeech 
(subject, of course, to their own sovereign's public-order laws and 
doctrines). Simply put, the negative reaction of an audience-
regardless of its location-ought not to be considered a valid basis for 
restricting domestic expression. 
Sometimes, offensive expression that originates in the United 
States but is conveyed by speakers in the global theater will implicate 
delicate foreign affairs and national security concerns. However, for a 
number of reasons, we ought to apply traditional First Amendment 
principles even when vituperative, bigoted, or otherwise offensive 
domestic expression may complicate or affect U.S. interests abroad. 52 
First, any interference with the federal government's foreign affairs 
and military functions from this offensive expression is likely to be 
marginal or minimal, thus falling short of the compelling interest 
necessary to uphold a content-based restriction on domestic 
expression. 53 Second, insofar as any putative foreign affairs 
justification for regulation is based upon offense taken by foreign 
leaders, allies, or diplomats, U.S. courts cannot deem this justification 
compelling for the previously stated reason-namely, the justification 
would still rest squarely upon the negative reaction of some audience. 
free speech); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (noting the lack of evidence that 
a courthouse audience was ready to strike Cohen for the offensive words on his jacket). 
50. See supra notes 5-6. 
51. This assumes, of course, that the speaker did not actually intend to incite an imminent 
riot or other violence abroad-a scenario discussed below. See infra notes 56-62 and 
accompanying text. 
52. With regard, in particular, to the enemy-aiding aspects of domestic speech, see infra 
notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
53. Cf Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724-25 (2010) (applying 
demanding scrutiny to content-based restriction expression). 
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Third, to the extent that domestic expression actually produces 
international offense or strife, U.S. officials, including the President, 
are constitutionally and otherwise empowered to clarify the position of 
the United States and to engage in diplomatic efforts to repair any 
damage to the nation's reputation. That would be a far less speech-
restrictive alternative than punishing the offensive domestic speaker. 
In some circumstances, transborder offense may result in 
hostile foreign audience members threatening domestic speakers with 
physical harm and violence. In the domestic-speech marketplace, 
hostile audiences and hecklers sometimes attempt to interfere with 
lawful First Amendment activities. The Supreme Court has indicated 
that, in certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for authorities to 
restrict speech in order to prevent a potentially violent audience from 
causing imminent harm to the speaker.54 However, the Court also 
indicated in several subsequent cases that authorities cannot use the 
mere existence of a hostile audience as justification for silencing a 
speaker otherwise engaged in lawful expression.55 Although the 
Supreme Court has not said so explicitly, this later precedent could 
impose some affirmative duty on officials to protect the speaker, at 
least insofar as circumstances reasonably permit. 56 
Like the incitement cases mentioned above, the so-called 
hostile-audience cases involved domestic speech conveyed to 
proximate, local audiences. The immediate concern was that someone 
or some group of persons in the audience might react violently to the 
speaker's message. To what extent do these audience-reaction 
principles apply in the emerging global theater, where expression 
frequently traverses borders and audiences may be located thousands 
of miles away? 
The fact that the early hostile-audience cases involved 
physically proximate contention in public places is merely a reflection 
54. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951). 
55. See Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970) (reversing convictions for disorderly 
conduct when it was impossible to determine if the grounds for the convictions were actual 
disorderly conduct or the defendants' advocacy of unpopular ideas); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 
394 U.S. 111 (1969) (holding that defendants marching peacefully to protest segregation could 
not be convicted of disorderly conduct even when individuals watching the march became 
unruly); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (reversing the convictions of a group of African 
Americans who refused to leave a public reading room); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) 
(reversing the conviction of a speaker who spoke to a group of students peacefully marching to 
protest segregation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding that a group of 
peacefully marching African Americans could not be convicted of breach of the peace). 
56. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 326 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (rejecting "the implication of the 
Court's opinion that the police had no obligation to protect petitioner's constitutional right to 
talk" and arguing that "if, in the name of preserving order, [the police] ever can interfere with a 
lawful public speaker, they first must make all reasonable efforts to protect him"). 
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of social and historical circumstances. Street-corner speeches and 
demonstrations were common forms of public expression and dissent 
in the 1950s and 1960s. As noted, today's speech marketplace includes 
rapid transborder exchanges and new forms of digital contention. 
Owing to interconnectivity and compression of space and time, hostile 
audiences and hecklers are now only a click away. Enemies can now 
digitally transmit threats across territorial borders in an instant, and 
there is at least the possibility that accomplices within the United 
States can carry out such threats. The possibility of some violent 
reaction to domestic expression from audiences abroad has become a 
disturbing reality. As noted in the Introduction, federal officials urged 
an American cartoonist to go into hiding after she received death 
threats from persons located abroad in response to her Internet 
posting calling on others to draw the Prophet Muhammad. 
As discussed earlier, the mere fact that domestic expression 
may offend some portion of an international audience is not a valid 
ground for governmental suppression or restriction of speech. The 
same principle ought to apply to speech that provokes an 
interconnected audience to react hostilely toward the speaker.57 Even 
if the violent reaction were considered to be an imminent threat to the 
speaker or to public order more generally, authorities should not order 
a domestic speaker to desist in the face of foreign threats. In essence, 
the rules of the global soapbox should be the same for cybercorner 
speakers as they are for street-corner speakers. 
The critical question is how to preserve domestic-speech rights 
in the face of such distant threats. In the traditional hostile audience 
situation, speakers are offered at least some assurance that 
authorities will engage in reasonable efforts to protect them from 
hostile reactions. In the global theater, those assurances will be much 
weaker or nonexistent. Authorities will be hampered by geography, 
distance, resource limitations, and jurisdictional complexities. 
Obviously, officials cannot police the global theater or protect every 
domestic speaker from global hostility. 
However, in at least some cases, officials will be aware of 
foreign threats of violence. If authorities are to fully protect domestic 
speakers in their exercise of speech rights in the global theater, they 
57. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("Nor do we have here an instance of the 
exercise of the State's police power to prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given 
group to hostile reaction."); Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321 (''It is one thing to say that the police cannot 
be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when 
as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to 
riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace."). 
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will have to provide additional security and protection in such cases. 
The Seattle cartoonist ought not to be forced to remain in hiding under 
an assumed identity, without any official protection or support, as a 
result of her exercise of free speech rights. Providing such protection 
could entail the expenditure of significant governmental resources. 
Just as such expenses must be paid to ensure robust debate in public 
places like streets and parks, governments may find that it is 
necessary to provide some measure of financial and other support to 
facilitate expression in the global theater. To be clear, my claim is not 
that authorities have an affirmative constitutional obligation to 
subsidize offensive speech in the global theater. However, insofar as 
cybercorner speakers face hostile foreign audiences, they are entitled 
to the same level or degree of protection as the street-corner 
antagonist. 
Ultimately, however, a substantial portion of the burdens 
associated with hostile global audiences will fall upon domestic 
speakers themselves. In traditional speech contexts, a speaker can 
carefully choose her platform and audience. In real space and time, 
the speaker is usually able to see and even hear potential hecklers. 
She is able to gauge audience characteristics and immediate audience 
reaction. Hence the speaker can decide to either alter or suppress a 
message in response to circumstances on the ground. In the global 
theater, speakers will often post messages on the Internet without 
carefully considering the potential audience or knowing much about 
audiences' expressive cultures. Contextual cues will be missing. 
Messages will frequently be conveyed to a global audience of diverse 
characteristics and viewpoints, with no way for speakers to gauge in 
the moment how global audiences are receiving their messages. 
Speakers who address particularly controversial matters in the 
global theater will thus face some difficult challenges regarding self-
censorship. As the Seattle cartoonist discovered, violent hecklers can 
be lurking anywhere in the global theater. If the global theater is to be 
a robust speech marketplace, much will depend on speakers' 
willingness to face the consequences of an uncertain degree of global 
hostility. Speakers will have to balance their desire to address 
controversial matters of global concern with their own psychological 
comfort and physical safety. Participation in the global theater will 
require degrees of speaker foresight and fortitude beyond that 
necessary for participation in more traditional local or domestic 
theaters. 
The current degree of protection afforded to offensive 
expression under the First Amendment establishes free speech norms 
and principles for the United States and its communities. However, in 
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the global theater, we must account for the now-obvious fact that 
offensive expression will frequently reach global audiences. We should 
not diminish the protection afforded to offensive domestic expression 
as a result of foreign-audience reaction or foreign-speech norms. This 
does not mean that the potential reaction of foreign audiences is 
wholly irrelevant or of no concern whatsoever to domestic speakers or 
U.S. officials. In the global theater, speakers must recognize that their 
utterances are not likely to be confined to familiar territory in which 
messages and speech norms are well understood. Authorities ought to 
be aware both that domestic expression can impact national interests 
abroad and that violent or threatening responses to domestic 
expression may emanate from distant sources. Most importantly, 
courts and officials ought not to abandon traditional marketplace 
principles in the global theater. Rather, as discussed in Part III, we 
ought to view events like the Koran burning and the hostile reaction 
to the Seattle cartoonist as opportunities for a more open global 
dialogue regarding free speech, tolerance, and comparative 
constitutional values. ss 
2. Transborder Incitement 
The preceding discussion focused on the implications of 
negative and harmful foreign reactions to transborder expression. 
Suppose, however, that the speaker intends or causes a reaction more 
serious than distant offense. Suppose instead that she specifically 
intends through expression to incite violence or unlawful activity 
beyond U.S. borders. Whether a speaker can be punished for 
transborder incitement is an unresolved First Amendment question, 
but one that we will inevitably have to answer in the global theater. 
Regulation of the category of speech known as "incitement" has 
long mediated a basic tension between allowing speakers to express 
unpopular viewpoints and the power of the state to protect citizens-
and even the state itself-from violence and unlawful conduct.59 
Under the contemporary incitement standard, speech advocating 
violence or other criminal action cannot be suppressed unless it is 
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely 
58. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (observing that "a function of 
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute" and that speech "may indeed 
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger"). 
59. See Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the 
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 331-42 (1978) (discussing the evolution 
of the incitement standard). 
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to incite or produce such action."60 To borrow Justice Holmes' famous 
example, a speaker who falsely shouts fire in a public theater, causing 
a riot or other disturbance, is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection. 61 
As Holmes recognized early on, incitement is generally a 
question of "proximity and degree."62 Proximity, in particular, has 
been a key consideration in the development of incitement doctrine. As 
a speaker comes ever closer to steeling an audience to actual violence, 
the state's interest in regulation becomes correspondingly stronger. As 
the Supreme Court observed in Dennis v. United States, the state is 
not required to wait for the "putsch" to actually occur.63 Rather, it may 
take action to secure its assets, interests, and institutions prior to the 
first shot being fired or the first act in furtherance of a conspiracy 
taking place. Nevertheless, the modern requirements of imminence 
and likelihood of harm impose serious constraints on the use of 
preemptive governmental power in response to expression that may 
produce public disorder, violence, and other unlawful activity.64 
From the early twentieth century to the present, the violence 
and unlawful activity of greatest concern in the Supreme Court's 
principal incitement cases were generally close at hand. Speakers and 
audiences were typically in close proximity to one another. The assets, 
interests, and institutions potentially affected by domestic expression, 
such as antiwar and communist propaganda, were typically located 
inside the United States.s5 Under twentieth century sedition, 
antiradicalism, and other public-order and security laws, federal and 
state officials generally sought to control the effects of speech intended 
to arouse a local and physically proximate audience to unlawful 
conduct or violence. 
This is not to suggest that foreign elements or effects were 
wholly irrelevant in early incitement cases. In particular, foreign 
ideological influences, including socialism and commumsm, were 
60. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 44 7 (1969). 
61. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
62. Id. 
63. 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951). 
64. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 755 (1975) (calling the Brandenburg 
formulation "the most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme Court"). 
65. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (associating with others to teach 
and advocate violent overthrow of government); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
(advocating socialist uprising and overthrow of domestic government); Debs v. United States, 249 
U.S. 211 (1919) (giving a public speech with the intent to obstruct the military draft); Schenck, 
249 U.S. at 49-51 (distributing pamphlets with the intent to interfere with military recruitment 
and enlistment). 
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central concerns in some cases.66 Moreover, the potential for 
disruption of military operations and threats to execution of U.S. 
policies and missions abroad were clearly part of the concern in some 
early incitement cases.67 However, the overriding concern in the early 
cases was not with remote deserters, foreign communists, or radical 
terrorist cells operating in foreign nations. The principal-and, in 
light of the speech at issue, most likely "imminent" -threats were 
related to the orderly conduct of the domestic draft, continued 
production of domestic munitions, and the survival of state and local 
governments. 
Suppose, however, that imminent harm is not likely to occur 
nearby, in a particular locality, state, or even within the U.S. Rather, 
suppose it is likely to occur, if at all, only in some distant location 
thousands of miles from U.S. territorial borders. Does the incitement 
doctrine apply to expression that is intended to and likely will produce 
such nonproximate, but still potentially imminent, harmful effects? 
Could the government prosecute a domestic speaker for inciting 
violence or unlawful acts halfway around the world? 
These questions made little sense in a world in which 
communication traveled very slowly, if at all, across territorial 
borders. However, owing to the characteristics of interconnectivity and 
compression of space and time, whether a speaker might be 
prosecuted and punished for transborder incitement is a close 
question. 
Although the dynamics of incitement have typically required 
physical proximity between the speaker and the target audience, 
digitization renders this factor far less critical. 68 Digitized expression 
can cover substantial distances in near-real time.69 Thus, it can often 
reach audiences located thousands of miles away in little more than 
an instant. Moreover, digitized expression can include not only text 
but also images and videos. Digitization and interconnectivity can 
produce exchanges that are quite similar to face-to-face encounters. 
66. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 363-64 (noting influence of Moscow Third International 
in defendants' teachings). 
67. See, e.g., Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49-51 (upholding against a First Amendment challenge 
the conviction of a defendant under the Espionage Act for circulating pamphlets advocating the 
disruption of the military draft). 
68. See Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and 
Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (2007) (discussing the effects that 
technologies, in particular computer networks, may have on the definition and regulation of 
incitement). 
69. This could impact the incitement analysis in cases where the audience is domestic but is 
located some distance from the speaker. I focus here on the scenario involving audiences located 
abroad. 
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This increases the likelihood that audience passions will be inflamed, 
missions will be efficiently and effectively coordj.pated, and orders will 
be rapidly executed. Moreover, compression complicates the drawing 
of clear lines between purely domestic or proximate threats and 
foreign or distant threats to public order. Determining whether a 
particular danger or harmful effect is imminent, proximate, or remote 
in space or time (or both) may be difficult in the global theater. 
Seemingly distant threats may be clearer, more vividly and 
realistically present, despite their nonproximate physical origins, and 
closer both in terms of space and time than they might otherwise 
appear. 
Owing to these considerations, it is at least plausible to include 
expression disseminated across interconnected global networks in the 
incitement category. Assuming both that a speaker intends by express 
advocacy to incite a foreign audience to unlawful action and the 
government can indeed show that such action is both imminent and 
likely to occur, authorities could restrict, prevent, or punish 
transborder communications in an effort to prevent foreign riots, 
disturbances, damages, or unlawful acts that are likely to harm U.S. 
assets, personnel, or interests abroad. 70 To be clear, I am not claiming 
that the United States could generally proscribe mere advocacy of 
unlawful action on the Internet. Indeed, I assume that under current 
First Amendment standards it cannot. Nor am I otherwise questioning 
the current incitement standard, which does not permit the outright 
suppression of extremist rhetoric or the mere teaching of violence. 71 
The narrower question is whether something we might call 
transborder incitement could be punished within the existing First 
Amendment framework. For the reasons stated, the answer is yes. 
70. The fact that the U.S. assets or interests that are potentially imperiled by domestic 
expression are located abroad ought not to make any difference. The United States can seek to 
protect its foreign military and other interests from domestic interferences, whether these take 
the form of tangible aid to enemies, unlawful possession of state secrets, or incitements to 
unlawful action or violence. If the United States can prosecute foreign speakers based upon the 
negative effects of their speech inside its territorial borders, surely it may prosecute a domestic 
speaker who threatens imminent harm to its extraterritorial assets and interests. For 
discussions of U.S. law and policy regarding extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, particularly 
on the basis of domestic effects, see Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegali:ty and Geoambiguous Law: A 
New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 125-30 (2010); 
Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 
1478-82 (2008); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2525 (2005). 
Of course, the United States would not have an exclusive global police power under this theory. 
Foreign riots and other disturbances would remain the concern of the states in which such acts 
physically occurred. Rather, American power would extend only to restrictions on incitement, 
whether it originates within the United States or abroad, which threatens U.S. assets and 
interests located in foreign countries. 
71. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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To be sure, prosecutions for transborder incitement are likely 
to be exceedingly rare. Among other things, they would require 
precision surveillance and impeccable timing by authorities. In order 
to demonstrate imminent harm in a case in which unlawful conduct 
has not yet occurred, the domestic speaker who intends to incite 
violence in Mghanistan or Yemen may have to be apprehended at the 
moment or just before he clicks "send."72 A perhaps more serious 
challenge would be for the government to prove that a foreign 
audience actually stood ready to participate in imminent violence or 
unlawful activity once the message was communicated. 
Interconnectivity certainly makes it easier to communicate inciting 
messages across international borders. The compression of space and 
time caused by digitized communication will speed the transmission of 
such messages. However, the requirements of imminence and 
likelihood of harm will pose serious practical and constitutional 
obstacles to prosecuting digitally facilitated transborder incitement. 
All of this assumes, of course, that the global theater will not 
fundamentally alter the First Amendment incitement standard and its 
traditional application. As scholars have noted, some with evident 
disappointment, the current incitement standard essentially precludes 
U.S. officials from restricting most of the extremist speech conveyed 
over the Internet.73 One question is whether, owing in substantial part 
to the unique characteristics of the global theater and in particular 
the emergence of the global threat of terrorism, courts and officials 
will create a more flexible and less speech-protective incitement 
standard that allows governments to restrict some extremist rhetoric 
and advocacy. If a domestic or foreign speaker can incite or facilitate 
violence against U.S. troops serving in foreign theaters from a desktop 
in Des Moines, perhaps it is time that we reconsider the imminence 
and likelihood elements of the current incitement standard.74 
72. Of course, this timing element could also affect a case involving a speaker in Brooklyn, 
New York, who intends to incite violence across the bridge in Manhattan. 
73. See, e.g., Tiffany Kamasara, Planting the Seeds of Hatred: Why Imminence Should No 
Longer Be Required to Impose Liability on Internet Communications, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 835, 837 
(2002). 
74. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 120--25 (2006) (suggesting that imminence and other requirements under 
Brandenburg may lack the necessary flexibility to address the threat of extremist expression); 
Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 233 
(2005) (questioning whether the Brandenburg test will ultimately survive new threats to 
security); Robert S. Tanenbaum, Comment, Preaching Terror: Free Speech or Wartime 
Incitement?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 785, 790 (2006) (arguing that the incitement standard "should be 
recast in the context of the War on Terror"). 
2012] FALSELY SHOUTING FIRE IN A GLOBAL THEATER 151 
Here, then, is another context in which we will have to decide 
whether to dilute traditional speech-protective standards in response 
to the complexities of the global theater. One obvious difficulty is that 
recalibrating the incitement standard as a counterterrorism measure 
may ultimately affect a wide swath of currently protected domestic 
advocacy and rhetoric. That may be a price some are willing to pay in 
order to suppress potentially dangerous, hateful, and extremist 
expression. However, we ought to remember that the incitement 
standard was calibrated to protect criticism of government and 
advocacy of unpopular viewpoints, particularly during times of global 
turmoil and unrest. 75 Further, as it was with communism and 
syndicalism, the root cause of terrorism is ideological. The early 
incitement cases, as well as subsequent events, demonstrate that 
suppressing certain "fighting faiths" is fundamentally inconsistent 
with our First Amendment values and principles.76 
Interconnectivity and compression will create new regulatory 
complexities and new risks of transborder violence and unlawful 
activity. However, these characteristics also create a more globally 
oriented marketplace of ideas. Altering the incitement standard by 
eliminating or diluting the imminence standard-a method suggested 
by many academics-may have substantial speech-restrictive effects 
in this emerging forum. In any event, even if American incitement 
standards were changed to outlaw terrorist advocacy, this would not 
solve the problem of terrorist incitement in the global theater. 77 The 
Internet is a transnational medium of expression, which means that 
nothing short of an international treaty or other agreement would be 
wholly effective in terms of regulating extremist rhetoric. 78 Rather 
than dilute the incitement standard, the government ought to rely on 
existing prohibitions on harmful conduct (i.e., federal espionage and 
other national security laws) and effective law-enforcement strategies 
that take into account the unique complexities of the global theater. 
There is an additional complexity with regard to incitement in 
the global theater. The foregoing discussion assumes that some legal 
75. Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 971 (2010). 
76. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen 
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more 
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out."). 
77. Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2002). 
78. See id. at 38 ("An extradition treaty offers the best hope for bringing to justice the 
disseminators of Internet hate speech."). 
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process will apply to the inciting citizen-speaker, and that his 
expression will enjoy at least some First Amendment protection. In 
the global theater, however, these are not certainties. In that theater, 
a citizen can incite domestic and foreign violence from across the 
globe. The domestic speaker, located on U.S. soil, will presumptively 
enjoy basic due process and First Amendment speech protections. But 
will the foreign citizen-inciter be entitled to similar protections?79 
Consider the case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, who had dual Yemeni 
and U.S. citizenship. The U.S. government accused Al-Aulaqi, who 
resided in Yemen, of inciting violence against its domestic and foreign 
interests, in part by posting videos and other materials on the 
Internet.80 Although the government claimed that he provided more 
tangible forms of material aid to terrorists in the United States and 
abroad, those claims were never established in any judicial process. 81 
Nevertheless, the Obama Administration targeted Al-Aulaqi for 
execution and subsequently killed him in a drone attack in Yemen.82 
Prior to the drone strike, Al-Aulaqi's father brought a lawsuit as next 
friend, asking the court to rule that, outside the context of armed 
conflict, the government can carry out the targeted killing of an 
American citizen only as a last resort to address an imminent threat 
to life or physical safety.s3 The lawsuit also asked the court to order 
the government to disclose the legal standard it uses to place U.S. 
citizens on government killlists.84 A district court dismissed the action 
on justiciability grounds, ruling that the plaintiffs father lacked 
standing to challenge the targeted-killing order on his behalf.85 
While Al-Aulaqi's case raises some obvious Fifth Amendment 
due process concerns, it also raises less commented-upon First 
Amendment free speech concerns. It is not clear to what extent the 
order targeted a citizen for extrajudicial killing based upon allegedly 
inciting communications. Indeed, under the federal government's 
79. The Supreme Court has assumed, but never explicitly held, that U.S. citizens are 
entitled to some First Amendment free speech protection while abroad. E.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (finding that, even assuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protections 
reach beyond the boundaries of the United States, Agee's First Amendment claim has no 
foundation). 
80. Eric Lipton, U.S.-Born Cleric Justifies the Killing of Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2010, at A10. 
81. Charlie Savage, Lawyers Seeking to Take Up Terror Suspect's Legal Case Sue U.S. for 
Access, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at A4. 
82. Scott Shane, A Legal Debate as C.I.A. Stalks a U.S. Jihadist, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, 
at Al. With regard to the drone attack, see Mazzetti, Schmitt & Worth, supra note 10. 
83. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2010). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 35. 
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approach, it is not clear that a speaker must be engaged in violent or 
terrorist-supporting conduct in order to be the subject of an 
extraterritorial execution order. In light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Humanitarian Law Project, discussed below, the 
government might claim that speech alone, if coordinated in some 
fashion with terrorists, constitutes adequate grounds for targeted 
execution.86 
Obviously, without some form of judicial review, we cannot 
know whether the speech in question meets the incitement, material 
support, or any other legal standard. Although the Obama 
Administration claims that the order was based, at least in part, on 
tangible support that Al-Aulaqi provided to terrorists, neither that 
claim nor any other will ever be subject to any standard of proof in a 
judicial proceeding. It thus remains possible that the U.S. government 
may issue an order directing the killing of a U.S. citizen living abroad 
for inciting violence through rhetoric posted on the Internet or 
through emails sent to domestic audiences advocating violence against 
the United States. However, such an order would be inconsistent with 
the First Amendment's broad protection for mere advocacy of unlawful 
action. In the global theater, we must ensure that extrajudicial 
punishments are consistent with free speech protections. Those 
citizens who take up arms and otherwise fight on behalf of U.S. 
enemies are subject to detention and perhaps other punishments. 
However, the First Amendment protects those who utter incendiary 
remarks on the Internet or engage in the mere advocacy of violent 
action. 
Interconnectivity and compression will facilitate the 
transmission of transborder, incendiary rhetoric and incitement in the 
global theater. In rare cases, the government may prosecute domestic 
speakers for incitement under traditional First Amendment 
standards. As the global theater develops, there will likely be 
continued calls for dilution of First Amendment standards relating to 
incitement. Government officials may also resort to extrajudicial 
measures to combat the threat from transborder incitement. The 
challenge will be to fashion an approach that protects the nation's 
domestic and foreign interests from harm, while simultaneously 
preserving the civil liberties of U.S. citizens-regardless of where they 
happen to be located. As the Al-Aulaqi case shows, the United States 
is still seeking that balance. 
86. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010) (noting that the 
material support law covers only speech communicated "to, under the direction of, or in 
coordination with" foreign terrorist organizations); see also discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
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B. Enemy-Aiding Expression 
In the global theater, a potentially expansive category of 
transborder, enemy-aiding expression may assist, support, or lend 
legitimacy to terrorists and other enemies of the nation. This 
expression will pose unique challenges to national security and foreign 
diplomacy. This Section applies First Amendment doctrines and 
principles to three types of enemy-aiding expression, as defined 
below-digitally distributed domestic dissent, expressive activity 
involving designated foreign terrorist organizations, and 
cybertreason. 87 
1. A Basic Definition 
A basic definition of enemy-aiding expression will facilitate the 
analysis. We might broadly define enemy-aiding expression as follows: 
any expression or association that aids or furthers the causes of 
enemies of the state.ss This support or facilitation can be 
demonstrated by (1) lending legitimacy to enemy causes or 
organizations; (2) materially assisting enemies of the state in carrying 
out their objectives; or (3) providing enemies of the state with 
treasonous "Aid and Comfort."89 
I am not contending that, either together or separately, these 
elements define a currently proscribed or unprotected category of 
expression.90 Indeed, I argue below that criminalizing speech on many 
of these grounds, including that it merely legitimizes enemies of the 
state, is fundamentally inconsistent with the First Amendment.91 
However, as a descriptive matter, these are the basic elements of a 
general category of expression that has already begun to pose unique 
87. See discussion of cybertreason infra Part II.B.4. 
88. "Enemies of the state" include persons formally designated as enemy combatants and 
persons or groups designated as terrorist threats by U.S. officials, as well as persons or groups 
not formally aligned with designated enemies who are nevertheless committed to taking or 
encouraging hostile action against the United States. 
89. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (setting forth the elements of the crime of treason). 
90. Thus, the listed elements do not comprise an unprotected category of expression like 
incitement or obscenity. Rather, the task is to define and describe the sort of expression that may 
be subject to regulation or prosecution owing to the aid or assistance it provides to enemies of the 
state. Whether expression that falls within this category is protected or unprotected depends on 
the context. Thus, speech that provides "material support" to terrorists is within the ambit of the 
First Amendment, while treasonous expression would be unprotected. 
91. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. Moreover, as explained below, the definition is 
obviously overbroad in the sense that it would cover clearly protected expression such as 
domestic political dissent. 
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challenges to traditional First Amendment doctrines and principles in 
the global theater. 
Note that the definition of enemy-aiding expression excludes 
pure conduct, including the provision of weapons, funds, or other 
materials to national enemies. Application of national security and 
other laws to these forms of conduct does not give rise to serious First 
Amendment concerns. As discussed earlier, some inciting expression 
could be enemy aiding under the above definition. However, as courts 
already treat incitement as a distinct unprotected category of 
expression, it will not be specifically addressed in this section. 92 
Finally, while the definition of enemy-aiding expression might have 
included the publication of confidential or secret government 
information, such publication raises distinct First Amendment free 
speech and press concerns and is therefore discussed separately 
below.93 
2. Domestic Rhetoric, Symbolism, and Dissent 
Particularly during wartime or other national emergencies, a 
range of domestic dissent, incendiary rhetoric, symbolic acts, and 
direct praise for the nation's enemies and their causes could assist 
U.S. enemies at home and abroad. A substantial amount of domestic 
dissent and political advocacy might assist, embolden, or legitimize 
the nation's enemies. This will become a more acute concern in the 
global theater. As explained in Part I, as a result of interconnectivity 
and compression, purely domestic dissent and contention will often 
quickly become matters of global concern and notoriety. These 
characteristics will increase the global salience of otherwise local 
statements and communications. 
In the global theater, almost any statement critical of the 
government, the nation, or its ideals can be broadcast rapidly and 
widely in a manner that could effectively aid, embolden, or legitimize 
national enemies. Thus, for example, bigoted statements by people 
vocally opposed to building an Islamic center in Manhattan might well 
anger and embolden foreign terrorists and foreign leaders. Sharp 
criticisms of President Obama, particularly during wartime, might be 
of immediate use to U.S. enemies both at home and on foreign 
battlefields. The same might be true of domestic war protests, flag 
burnings, speeches favoring the election of antiwar candidates, 
statements of religious bigotry that cast Muslims and other religious 
92. See discussion of incitement in the emerging global theater supra Part II.A.2. 
93. See discussion infra Part II. C. 
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adherents as evildoer~ or murderers, and even editorials that defend 
the basic rights of enemy combatants or foreign terrorist groups. Even 
the previously described Koran-burning event has been characterized 
as enemy-aiding expression. According to President Obama and other 
high-level cabinet and military officials, the Florida pastor's plan to 
burn a copy of the Koran not only threatened the safety of U.S. troops 
abroad, but it was also likely to serve as a "recruitment bonanza" for 
al-Qaeda and other enemies.94 
As discussed below, the government might argue that some of 
this speech is punishable because it is coordinated in some fashion 
with designated enemies of the state.95 Putting that situation aside for 
the moment, however, the government lacks the authority to suppress 
independent, domestic political expression solely because its content 
might somehow aid the enemy.96 This ought to be the case whether or 
not the domestic speaker intends by his rhetoric or symbolic act to 
undermine American foreign or domestic interests. 97 As Eugene 
Volokh has observed, under traditional First Amendment doctrines 
and principles "much· speech that does help the enemy must remain 
constitutionally protected."98 
In the global theater, including during wartime, it is 
imperative that Americans retain the right to evaluate their 
government and to engage in political debate. This is true even if the 
transborder expression might appreciably weaken U.S. citizens' 
resolve or assist enemies by emboldening or legitimizing them to some 
extent. A contrary rule would imperil a vast amount of public political 
debate in the United States. Punishing or restricting domestic rhetoric 
and dissent on the ground that it might aid the nation's foreign 
enemies would curb citizen self-government by limiting participation 
in debates of global concern. 
94. Cave & Bamard, supra note 4. 
95. See infra notes 96-99_and accompanying text. 
96. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) ("If the First 
Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of 
citizens, for simply engaging in political speech."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
269 (1964) (stating that the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people" (quoting Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))); see also Volokh, supra note 14, at 1342 (arguing that 
domestic antiwar speech should "probably" be protected, since it may "contribute valuable 
arguments to an important public debate"). 
97. See Volokh, supra note 14, at 1342 (noting the dangers of reliance upon an intent 
standard in this and other contexts). 
98. Id. at 1341. 
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3. Providing ''Material Support" to Foreign Terrorists 
As noted in Part I, in the global theater U.S. citizens will 
increasingly interact with aliens beyond our borders in a variety of 
political, humanitarian, cultural, and other endeavors. Some of these 
transborder relationships will involve persons or groups that the 
federal government has officially designated as terrorists. In various 
online forums, speakers will also have opportunities to disseminate 
favorable messages and information regarding both designated and 
unofficial national enemies. Insofar as these and similar forms of 
speech and association might aid, embolden, or legitimize these 
enemies, will they be protected under the First Amendment? 
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court 
held that federal laws barring the provision of "material support" to 
groups the State Department has labeled "foreign terrorist 
organizations" do not violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech 
and freedom of association guarantees, either facially or as applied to 
citizens' lawful speech that is "coordinated" with such groups.99 The 
expression at issue in Humanitarian Law Project consisted of advising 
and training foreign groups such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on peaceful and lawful means of 
resolving their political grievances.l00 Among other things, U.S. 
citizens wished to work with these groups to teach them how to file 
petitions with the United Nations.l01 According to the Court, so long 
as this sort of expression is "coordinated" with the disfavored groups, 
the government may constitutionally proscribe it under the material 
support provisions-even if the speakers did not specifically intend to 
further the organizations' illegal and violent enterprises_102 
Depending in part upon how it is interpreted and applied, 
Humanitarian Law Project may set a very bad precedent for the 
treatment of transborder expression and association. The majority 
opinion is arguably inconsistent with several fundamental First 
Amendment principles.l03 At a broad level, the Court's decision is in 
99. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-13, 2730-31 (2010). 
100. ld. at 2713-14. 
101. Id. at 2729-30. 
102. Id. at 2717-18, 2726. Under the relevant provisions, it is enough that the speakers 
provide material support knowing that the recipient is a foreign terrorist organization. The law 
does not require a specific intent to aid violent or other terrorist causes. ld. at 2717. 
103. For criticisms of the decision, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THEW AR ON TERROR 60-62 (2003) (comparing "material support" 
prohibitions in the context of "cutting off funds for terrorism" with association with the 
Communist Party during the Cold War era and noting that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly 
ruled that that the Constitution prohibits punishment for association absent proof that an 
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deep tension with traditional interpretations of the First Amendment, 
which emphasize a commitment to protecting political speech and 
truth seeking through deliberation while also expressly rejecting the 
imposition of guilt by association.l04 As Justice Breyer argued in 
dissent, a long line of precedent precludes governments from imposing 
content-based restrictions on citizens' relations with officially 
disfavored persons or groups or criminalizing mere association with 
them.l05 Indeed, transformative twentieth-century free speech battles, 
which often centered on ideological restrictions on radical, socialist, 
and communist speech and association, teach that foreign ideologies 
ought to be met with robust counterspeech rather than governmental 
suppression. 106 Yet, Humanitarian Law Project places no burden 
whatsoever on the government to demonstrate that citizens are 
actively and intentionally engaged in a joint venture with enemies of 
the state whose purpose is to inflict harm or engage in violence. 
Instead, the decision effectively allows Congress to criminalize 
peaceful, political expression and association in part on the ground 
individual specifically intended to further the unlawful ends of the group"); Wadie E. Said, The 
Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 588-92 (2011) (arguing that 
credibly linking charitable contributions to terrorist violence for § 2339B prosecutions sets the 
stage for "an extended discussion of foreign policy in the courtroom" for which courts are ill-
equipped to handle); Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at-and 
Beyond-Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1579 (2010) (arguing that material support 
prohibitions, as interpreted by the government, appear to prohibit U.S. residents from engaging 
in "pure political speech" that promotes "lawful and nonviolent activity"). For a general defense 
of the law's constitutionality and application, see generally Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: 
Hybrid Scrutiny, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech (Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 101), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1777371 (arguing that the decision in Humanitarian Law Project has "roots in 
the Framers' concerns about foreign influence" and has "parallels with constitutional 
justifications for professional regulation"). 
104. See sources cited supra note 96. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
886, 908 (1982) (''The right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because 
some members of the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is 
not protected."); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) ("If there were a similar 
blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, there would 
indeed be a real danger that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired ... 
. "); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (stating that the State may not "seize[ ] upon 
mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a 
criminal charge," in lieu of prosecuting individuals for "violations of valid laws"). 
105. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2732-34 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
106. See id. at 2738 ("To apply [the majority's argument] to the teaching of a subject such as 
international human rights law is to adopt a rule of law that, contrary to the Constitution's text 
and First Amendment precedent, would automatically forbid the teaching of any subject in a case 
where national security interests conflict with the First Amendment."). 
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that it might lend some aid or legitimacy to designated foreign 
terrorist organizations.I07 
Although the Court sought to carve out a safe haven for speech 
that is not coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations, its 
decision rests on principles of fungibility, legitimacy, and diplomacy 
that might also apply to at least some "independent" political 
expression transmitted in the global theater. The Court reasoned that 
words and more tangible forms of support, including cash, are 
essentially "fungible" resources insofar as terrorist organizations are 
concerned.1°8 Specifically, it equated words and weapons in two 
distinct respects. First, the Court claimed that speakers who provide 
assistance in the form of legal instruction or petition-filing activities 
will enable the benefited groups to channel organizational resources to 
more violent activities. 109 The Court reasoned that since terrorist 
organizations do not segregate their funds, teaching the leaders of 
such organizations how to navigate international law and processes is 
essentially the same thing as contributing to the organizations' 
violent-activities funds.1 10 Second, the Court concluded that foreign 
terrorist organizations might engage in tactical and opportunistic 
behavior.l11 For example, such groups might participate in speech and 
associational activities intended to advance their lawful causes at the 
United Nations "as a means of buying time to recover from short-term 
setbacks, lulling opponents into complacency, and ultimately 
preparing for new attacks."112 
Even if it's true that some designated foreign terrorist 
organizations engage in this sort of behavior, the broad proposition 
that words can be equated to weaponry remains antithetical to the 
First Amendment. Indeed, accepting this proposition might require 
that we revisit the First Amendment's broad protection for a range of 
potentially harmful expression and expressive associations. 
In general, under the First Amendment, advocacy, training, 
and collaboration are properly viewed as means of persuasion, 
instruction, or pursuit of common causes, rather than as potentially 
dangerous commodities one might use to further violent ends. 
However, the Court's approach in Humanitarian Law Project 
107. But see Margulies, supra note 103, at 32-40 (arguing that the Humanitarian Law 
Project decision preserves "safe harbors" for independent advocacy, scholarship, journalism, 
human rights monitoring, and legal representation). 
108. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725. 
109. ld. 
110. Id. 
111. ld. at 2729-30. 
112. ld. at 2729. 
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presumes that citizens who wish to engage in training and other 
associative endeavors with disfavored foreign organizations are 
always dupes, and that no good can come from such transborder 
relationships.l13 The Court's logic is also inconsistent with the 
principle that speech may not be restricted or suppressed solely on the 
ground that an audience might use it for some improper purpose-
including, presumably, for obfuscation or delay. 114 Finally, although 
the Court concluded that the material support provisions regulated 
speech, by treating words as a form of material support the Court 
blurred the distinction between conduct and expression.l15 Under that 
distinction, while the government may freely regulate the tangible 
effects of harmful conduct, it must tread more carefully insofar as 
words and other expressive forms are concerned. 116 
As noted, the Court stated that the material support laws did 
not apply to "independent" political speech. 117 However, the majority's 
fungibility reasoning would appear to apply with full force to much of 
the ordinary domestic enemy-aiding expression discussed above. If 
words alone may constitute a form of material support, then it is not 
clear why even "independent" expression by U.S. citizens on behalf of 
or in support of terrorists could not be criminalized. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, a substantial amount of domestic 
dissent and contention may be useful to national enemies. A video file 
of an American citizen burning the Koran could prove far more useful 
to al-Qaeda than a brief filed on its behalf in a U.S. court or a petition 
filed on its behalf at the United Nations. Moreover, a speaker or 
journalist who independently posts the musings of a radical al-Qaeda 
cleric denouncing the United States and advocating violence against 
its people would arguably allow the organization to channel its 
resources to more violent purposes. It might also facilitate the group's 
ability to attract "funds," "financing," and "goods" from other 
sources.118 Under the Court's fungibility principle, the government 
113. See Margulies, supra note 103, at 4 (observing that some foreign terrorist organizations 
"use truces as tactical devices" and capitalize on "information asymmetries"). 
114. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) 
(invalidating a municipal ban on posting of "for sale" or "sold" signs on homeowners' properties, 
which was designed to prevent "the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated 
community"). 
115. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724 (differentiating speech that conveys a 
"specific skill" from speech that imparts "general or unspecialized knowledge"). 
116. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (providing limited circumstances 
in which govemment can regulate free expression). 
117. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726, 2730. 
118. Id. at 2726 n.6 (quoting McKune Affidavit). 
2012] FALSELY SHOUTING FIRE IN A GLOBAL THEATER 161 
could criminalize much of the domestic dissent and political 
contention discussed in the previous section. 
The Court sought to deflect such concerns by noting that the 
material support provisions only apply to speech and association that 
are "coordinated" with designated foreign terrorist organizations. 119 
By contrast, independent expression, such as that described above, 
would presumably enjoy a safe harbor. However, the Court did not 
clarify why "coordination" was constitutionally dispositive and, more 
importantly, failed to actually define the distinction between 
"coordinated" and "independent" expression.120 If, as the Court 
expressly stated, it is legal for citizens to join foreign terrorist 
organizations as members, then what level of "coordination" would 
run afoul of the material support provisions?121 What sort of 
relationship between a speaker and a designated foreign terrorist 
organization would subject the speaker to liability for peaceful 
expression and association ?122 
The Humanitarian Law Project Court also concluded that 
peaceful and lawful political expression, when coordinated with a 
foreign terrorist organization, may be criminalized on the ground that 
it might lend "legitimacy" to terrorist causes. 123 Again, especially 
without some clear idea of what "coordination" entails, it is difficult to 
compare this type of legitimating expression to other forms of 
domestic speech that might also legitimize the nation's enemies. In 
the emerging global theater, any digital soapbox orator may lend 
credibility or "legitimacy'' to terrorists or their causes simply by 
posting flattering or laudatory videos and other information on the 
Internet. Legitimacy and its attendant benefits would presumably 
flow to the enemy regardless of whether the expression was 
"independent" from or was "coordinated" with the beneficiary.124 Thus, 
119. Id. at 2726. 
120. See id. at 2732-33, 2737 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reliance upon 
coordination and its failure to provide a workable definition distinguishing "coordinated" from 
"independent" expression). 
121. Id. at 2723. 
122. One commentator claims that the Court was concerned only with "speech related to 
agency." Margulies, supra note 103, at 19. However, the majority in Humanitarian Law Project 
did not rely expressly upon agency principles or doctrines in fashioning the 
coordinated/independent distinction. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721-23 
(analyzing the statute in question using statutory interpretive methods apart from agency 
principles). 
123. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725. 
124. See id. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulty with the legitimacy 
principle in general and with the government's apparent claim that even some forms of 
"independent" expression, including the filing of amicus briefs on behalf of enemies of the state, 
might be covered by the material support provisions). 
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like the fungibility principle, the legitimacy principle threatens to 
sweep in a large swath of otherwise protected political expression. 125 
Finally, the Court relied on foreign-affairs concerns in 
upholding the material support provisions.126 Specifically, it noted 
that United States allies might "react sharply" if the government were 
to permit citizens to collaborate in even peaceful endeavors with 
common enemies. 127 As explained earlier, foreign offense is not an 
adequate basis upon which to restrict or suppress domestic symbolic 
acts like Koran-burning or incendiary communications made in the 
heat of domestic political debates. 128 This is true even in cases where 
such speech might complicate U.S. diplomacy. The fact that domestic 
speech may alienate foreign allies is not a valid ground for restricting 
lawful, peaceful speech between citizens and foreign organizations-
even those organizations designated as "terrorists" by the federal 
government. 
Depending on how the decision is interpreted and applied, 
Humanitarian Law Project may undercut the central conclusion in the 
previous section-namely, that domestic political expression cannot be 
criminalized on the ground that it might aid the nation's enemies. In 
the emerging global theater, citizens' expression and association will 
more frequently intersect with foreign affairs and national security 
concerns. Under the Court's gauzy "coordination" standard, citizens 
who collaborate with designated foreign terrorist organizations on 
foreign humanitarian projects, lawyers who file amicus briefs in U.S. 
courts on behalf of designated enemies of the state, individuals who 
post speeches and videos on the Internet that praise the nation's 
enemies, and domestic newspapers that provide editorial space to 
targeted enemies may all be engaging in felonious enemy-aiding 
expression. 129 
If that is so, the chances that political, humanitarian, national 
security, and other critical transborder dialogues will be chilled or 
suppressed in the global theater will increase substantially. Whatever 
political and diplomatic decisions officials might take with regard to 
engagement with hostile foreigners and regimes, it is critically 
important that the First Amendment be interpreted and understood 
125. But see Margulies, supra note 103, at 30 (attempting to draw a distinction between 
"functional and ideational senses" of "legitimacy," and arguing that the majority in 
Humanitarian Law Project was actually only concerned with the functional sense of the term). 
126. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
127. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726. 
128. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
129. But see Margulies, supra note 103, at 32-40 (interpreting Humanitarian Law Project as 
placing such independent speech activities in statutory "safe harbors"). 
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such that channels of communication between citizens and aliens, 
including even hostile aliens, remain as open as possible. This does 
not mean, of course, that restrictions on such contacts are never 
appropriate. However, any restrictions ought to be narrowly tailored 
to prevent intentional efforts to further violent ends, rather than 
broad measures designed to cut off all contact with certain disfavored 
aliens or groups of aliens. Our First Amendment will have to be more 
protective of foreign contacts and collaborations than this if it is to 
retain its usefulness and vigor in the twenty-first century.l30 
The Court has made its ruling. It has chosen not to force the 
government to demonstrate that citizens' speech to and association 
with designated foreign terrorist organizations meet the exacting 
standards for incitement to unlawful action. 131 However, there are at 
least two things Congress can do that would narrow the scope of the 
material support laws and would thereby help to preserve 
opportunities for cross-border engagement and association. 
First, Congress could codify a standard with respect to 
"coordinated" expression that requires prosecutors to prove that a 
close agency relationship or a similar working relationship exists 
between citizens and designated foreign terrorist groups. This would 
serve to clarify which types of relationships or associations are being 
criminalized, narrow the scope of the prohibition to the most 
dangerous and harmful joint enterprises, target a form of conduct 
rather than pure speech, and ensure that "independent" domestic 
political expression cannot be the object of prosecution. Second, 
Congress could codify an intent standard that would criminalize 
otherwise protected speech and association only when "the defendant 
knows or intends that those activities will assist the organization's 
unlawful terrorist actions." 132 These amendments would bring the 
"material support" provisions closer to affinity with long-standing 
First Amendment principles, and they would ensure that the 
transborder channels of communication between citizens and aliens 
remain as open as possible in the global theater. 
130. See generally Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward 
a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941 (2011) (supporting a more cosmopolitan 
First Amendment approach that embraces cross-border information flow and protects speech and 
other First Amendment interests domestically and abroad). 
131. See Owen Fiss, The World We Live In, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 295, 306 (2011) (arguing that 
material support provisions must meet incitement standards set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio). 
132. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2740 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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4. Cybertreason 
Treasonous expression is perhaps the most dangerous form of 
enemy-aiding communication. Under the Constitution and federal law, 
any person owing allegiance to the United States who "adheres" to the 
enemy and through some "overt act" provides it with "[a]id and 
[c]omfort" may be found guilty of treason. 133 In addition to perhaps 
constituting the provision of material support (as discussed above), 
certain forms of speech or association favoring the nation's enemies 
may constitute treasonous adherence and the provision of aid and 
comfort.134 
In the global theater, application of the Treason Clause and 
related federal criminal laws to enemy-aiding expression could give 
rise to significant First Amendment concerns. 135 Treasonous 
expression could take many forms, including pure speech and symbolic 
acts. A citizen speaker who reveals state secrets to foreign enemies 
might be found guilty of treason. 136 Citizens who travel abroad and 
meet with foreign enemies or principals in an effort to undermine U.S. 
policies could also be liable under the strict letter of federal treason 
laws. 137 The same fate might befall citizens who travel abroad to 
demonstrate as "human shields" against U.S. military campaigns.138 
133. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. The clause reads, in full, "Treason against the United 
States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving 
them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two 
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." Id. The federal treason statute 
provides: 
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to 
their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is 
guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years 
and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding 
any office under the United States. 
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006). 
134. See generally Bell, supra note 14, at, 1005-06 (identifying a "treacherous gap" between 
clearly treasonous behavior established by courts and protected criticism of government action). 
135. See id. 
136. Cf. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995) (upholding criminal punishment 
for publishing confidential information in violation of governmental restrictions). 
137. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1004 (citing as a possible example Jane Fonda's activities in 
Vietnam). 
138. See Gabriel H. Teninbaum, American Volunteer Human Shields in Iraq: Free Speech or 
Treason?, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 139, 158 (2004) (arguing that "human shields" may 
have acted treasonously, but that for several reasons likelihood of prosecution for treason was 
low). Thus far, courts have rejected free speech arguments in human shield cases. See Clancy v. 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, 559 F.3d 595, 605 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that sanctions 
imposed for travel to Iraq in violation of executive order restricted conduct rather than speech); 
Karpova v. Snow, 402 F. Supp. 2d 459, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that enforcement of 
regulations restricting travel to Iraq did not give rise to any First Amendment claim and, that 
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However, the greatest potential threat to free speech in the 
global theater could arise from the application of treason laws to 
modern forms of propagandizing on behalf of the nation's enemies. 
This would include posting or linking to speeches by terrorist groups 
and their leaders, distributing messages or information that support 
enemies' violent or nonviolent causes, and defending national enemies 
from criticism online. 139 No court has ever addressed whether a 
speaker may be convicted of cybertreason for posting enemy 
propaganda or other forms of enemy-aiding expression on the 
Internet. 
The notion that the government might pursue such a treason 
prosecution in such circumstances is not as far-fetched as it may 
sound.l40 Indeed, during the World War II era, several courts held or 
strongly suggested that propaganda and other expression conveyed on 
behalf of the nation's enemies might be sufficient grounds for a 
treason conviction.141 As commentators have noted, under these 
precedents a defendant's expression or expressive acts alone might 
demonstrate "adherence" to the enemy and the requisite "overt act" 
providing unlawful "aid and comfort."142 
In the global theater, a much wider range of expression and 
expressive acts might fall within the potential domain of the treason 
laws. In the World War 11-era cases, citizens had to travel abroad in 
order to use the enemy's communications networks and were engaged 
in close employment relationships or other agency relationships with 
enemy agents or governments. 143 With the advent of the Internet, 
insofar as a traveler's actions as a human shield were expressive conduct, the travel regulations 
satisfied First Amendment standards). 
139. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1006-09 (positing a hypothetical "al-Qaeda Al," who posts 
messages to his own blog that could benefit global terrorist networks). 
140. See id. at 1010-26 (discussing elements of treason law, as interpreted and applied by 
courts, in the context of Internet postings). 
141. See D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) (affirming the conviction of 
Imperial Japanese propagandist, alias "Ann" or "Orphan Ann"); Burgman v. United States, 188 
F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (affirming the treason conviction of a Nazi propagandist); Best v. 
United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950) (affirming the treason conviction of another Nazi 
propagandist); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (affirming the treason 
prosecution of yet another Nazi propagandist); Chandler v. United States 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 
1948) (affirming the treason conviction of Nazi propagandist, alias "Paul Revere"). 
142. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1012-26 (addressing application of treason requirements to 
instances of pure speech); Volokh, supra note 14, at 1341-42 (addressing whether a speaker 
could be punished for treason merely for making antiwar statements). 
143. See Best, 184 F.2d at 135 (describing defendant's preparation of propaganda broadcasts 
to the United States via shortwave radio); Gillars, 182 F.2d at 966 (noting that defendant helped 
in preparation of German propaganda broadcasts to the United States); United States v. 
Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568, 569 (D.D.C. 1949) (observing that defendant was employed by the 
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physical relocation is not required in order to propagandize effectively. 
Further, owing to the fact that terrorist networks do not operate on a 
strict bureaucratic basis, it may be difficult to determine who is 
aligned with them or who is adhering to them. 144 If "adherence" 
roughly equates to the "coordination" standard discussed in 
Humanitarian Law Project, and speech alone can constitute an "overt 
act," then a wide swath of cyber-rhetoric and other expression may fall 
within the ambit of the treason laws. 
Humanitarian Law Project recently confirmed that even pure 
speech, if somehow coordinated with the nation's enemies, might be 
subject to criminal prosecution consistent with the First 
Amendment. 145 However, consideration of the Treason Clause's 
original meaning, postwar developments in First Amendment 
doctrine, and concerns regarding the chilling potential of prosecutions 
for cybertreason all weigh heavily against recognition of the global-
theater crime of cybertreason. 
As other commentators have noted, punishing pure speech or 
association as treason is inconsistent with the original understanding 
of the Treason Clause, which the framers of the Constitution viewed 
as a shield against prosecution for political expression. 146 Further, as I 
argued earlier in the context of prosecution for "material support," the 
contemporary scope of the treason laws ought to be measured against 
the lessons of twentieth-century free speech debates.l47 In particular, 
we need to account for post-World War II developments with respect 
to First Amendment doctrine. A far more speech-protective standard 
has replaced the comparatively speech-restrictive "clear and present 
danger" standard applied in World War II-era treason cases. 148 That 
German government to prepare propaganda broadcasts to the U.S.), aff'd, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. 
Cir. 1951). 
144. See Matthew Lippman, The New Terrorism and International Law, 10 TULSA J. COMP. 
& INT'L L. 297, 302-03 (2003) (describing the functional structure of contemporary terrorist 
organizations). 
145. See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text. 
146. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND 
CENTURY, 1888--1986, at 298--99 (1990) ("[S]trong arguments have been made that the Framers 
did mean to forbid punishment of mere 'treasonable' words under any label; otherwise their 
central goal of eliminating punishment for acts earlier viewed as 'constructive' treason would not 
have been achieved.") (emphasis omitted); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE 
UNITED STATES 143 (Greenwood Publ'g. Corp. 1971) (1945) (discussing framers' views that 
Treason Clause would prevent "the suppression of political opposition or the legitimate 
expression of views on the conduct of public policy''); Bell, supra note 14, at 1027-28 (arguing 
that prosecution of pure speech subverts the original meaning of the Treason Clause). 
147. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text. 
148. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (setting forth the modern incitement 
standard); Gunther, supra note 64, at 755 (referring to the Brandenburg formulation as "the 
most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme Court"). 
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standard, which demands a showing by the government of likely and 
imminent harm from potentially dangerous expression, 149 counsels 
against prosecution for treason (resulting in a possible death sentence) 
based solely upon expression that exhibits support for, adherence to, 
or comfort for enemies of the state. 
Moreover, from the postwar period to the present, the Supreme 
Court has consistently expressed strong support for citizens' freedom 
to criticize government and engage in political debate.l5° While it is 
true that speech during wartime has at times been less robustly 
protected than in peaceful eras, this historical fact does not counsel in 
favor of the application of the treason laws to cyberpropaganda. 151 So 
long as we are in a state of perpetual war (broadly defined), a 
substantial amount of domestic political expression could come under 
the formal letter of the nation's treason laws. As noted earlier, owing 
to the characteristics of the global theater, liability for cybertreason 
will cast a much wider net than treason's traditional domain. 152 If we 
are to have robust political discussion in the global theater, 
application of the treason laws, like application of the material 
support laws, must be based upon something more than a speaker's 
expression of sympathy for enemies or the possibility that speech 
might aid their causes. 
As in the material support context, speakers may combine or 
conspire with enemies in a manner that threatens compelling national 
security interests. Nothing said thus far would preclude prosecution 
for the provision of tangible forms of aid, the receipt of funds for 
services rendered to terrorists or other enemies, or otherwise 
participating in joint criminal enterprises. 
However, with regard to purer forms of speech or symbolic 
conduct, prosecutions for cybertreason must be subject to narrow 
constraints. Should courts have occasion to revisit the World War H-
era treason decisions in global theater contexts, they should reject the 
major premise of some of those cases that expression and expressive 
association alone can support a treason conviction. 153 Instead, courts 
should require that the government demonstrate some close 
149. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
150. E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010); NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 269 (1964). 
151. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM 
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THEW AR ON TERRORISM (2004). 
152. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1032-34 (discussing overbreadth problems under current 
treason law). 
153. See generally id. 
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relationship between the speaker and the enemy in order to sustain a 
treason indictment. 
Commentators have disagreed regarding the specific extent to 
which a speaker must be affiliated with an enemy of the state such 
that prosecution for treason would satisfy the First Amendment. 154 In 
order to protect the widest possible range of expression in the global 
theater, Congress and the courts ought to require close employment 
and agency relationships, which demonstrate a sufficient connection 
and adherence to the enemy. 155 The relationships in some of the World 
War II era cases involved traveling to foreign countries, using enemy 
broadcast equipment, and taking specific instructions from enemies.156 
Travel abroad need not be a requirement; as noted, speakers can 
participate in joint enterprises today without ever leaving their desks. 
However, prosecutors should have to prove an overt act other than the 
posting of enemy-aiding videos or other speech on the Internet, 
independent translation of enemy messages, or the communication of 
statements that advocate terrorism or praise terrorist methods or 
results. 
For example, the requisite relationship might be present where 
the speaker establishes a dedicated website at the request of an 
enemy person or organization, provides technical support for enemy 
propaganda efforts, or posts messages as instructed by the enemy 
organization. These acts, which more closely resemble the provision of 
tangible assistance and material resources than pure speech, may be 
used to establish the requisite collaboration between the speaker and 
enemy. Speech in furtherance of the relationship, including the 
transmission of operational plans and technological and other 
information concerning bomb making, could also be considered 
evidence of treasonous intent. In no circumstance, however, would 
speech that merely favors, praises, legitimizes, or offers ideological 
support for enemy causes come within the domain of the nation's 
treason laws. 
In the global theater, potentially treasonous expression will 
proliferate along with the communications networks that carry it to 
far-flung global audiences. As a general matter, the crime of 
154. Compare id. at 1040-41 (suggesting that an employment standard should be used to 
demonstrate "adherence" to the enemy), with Volokh, supra note 14, at 1342 (suggesting that the 
proper test might be whether speaker was being paid by the enemy or otherwise coordinated his 
activities with the enemy). 
155. See, e.g., Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 1950); Gillars v. United 
States 182 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568, 569-70 
(D.D.C. 1949), af{'d, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
156. See, e.g., Best, 184 F.2d at 135; Gillars, 182 F.2d at 966; Burgman, 87 F. Supp. at 569. 
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cybertreason ought to be rejected as inconsistent with the original 
meaning of the Treason Clause and the postwar development of First 
Amendment doctrine relating to political expression. Courts should 
limit the scope of the treason laws to cases in which the government 
demonstrates a close agency-like relationship between the domestic 
speaker and the enemy. Narrowing the interpretation of the Treason 
Clause in this manner will ensure that both our domestic and 
transborder marketplaces of ideas remain robust, while also allowing 
officials to pursue those engaged in unlawful and dangerous enemy-
aiding joint enterprises. 
C. The Distribution of Government Secrets in the Global Theater 
As the WikiLeaks episode shows, the emergence of the global 
theater will significantly complicate the government's ability to 
control and maintain even its own secrets. Governments will of course 
not be powerless to protect state secrets and other confidential 
information in the global theater. Officials can prosecute leakers 
under espionage, confidentiality, and other national security laws. 
Thus, individuals like Private Bradley Manning, who allegedly leaked 
war and diplomatic information to the website WikiLeaks, will not 
avoid prosecution and potential punishment. 157 However, governments 
all over the world will have a much more difficult time maintaining 
control over the publication and dissemination of confidential and 
secret information, particularly once it is in the hands of foreign 
recipients. 
One of the unique problems in the global theater is the ease 
with which an American leaker can quickly deliver confidential 
information to a foreign distributor, who then disseminates the 
information on the Internet. There are a number of legal and practical 
obstacles to U.S. prosecutions of what is shaping up to be a new kind 
of global press. 
First, there are jurisdictional concerns and issues relating to 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. national security and other 
laws. It seems reasonably clear that the Espionage Act of 1917, the 
statute that has most often been discussed in connection with Julian 
Assange's possible prosecution, applies to extraterritorial 
dissemination of government secrets (by both citizens and aliens). 158 
157. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36--37 (1984); Robert C. Post, The 
Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 169 (1984); see also Haig v. 
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511-12 (1980). 
158. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1932) (U.S. criminal laws 
generally extend to citizens residing abroad); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) 
170 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1:125 
Second, even if the United States were to indict Assange, it is not clear 
that the foreign government holding him would deliver him to 
American authorities. 159 Third, in contemplating prosecution, the 
government must at least consider the possibility that Assange will 
follow through on his stated threat to disclose additional troves of 
confidential information in his possession should the United States 
pursue legal action against him. 16° Fourth, even if Assange is 
extradited to the United States and successfully prosecuted, the 
leaked cables and other information cannot now be retrieved and 
cordoned off from public view. Thus, U.S. officials must ask whether 
any prosecution of Assange would ultimately be worth the effort. 
Assuming that the United States is able to overcome these 
various obstacles and proceed to prosecute Assange, serious First 
Amendment issues will arise. The first issue is whether Assange, as a 
foreign national, could claim any protection under the First 
Amendment's Free Speech and Free Press Clauses. If he was in U.S. 
custody and on U.S. soil, Assange might be able to invoke the 
protections of the First Amendment. 161 I say "might" because the 
Supreme Court has never decided whether a defendant who is 
involuntarily in the United States may invoke the First Amendment 
in a proceeding related to information distribution or other speech 
activities abroad. 162 Assuming that the First Amendment does apply, 
(fraud against a government corporation); United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 197 (D. Mass. 
1985) (stating that the Espionage Act applies to acts of foreign nationals abroad); United States 
v. Helmich, 521 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 1981) ("[I]t is clear that the legislative intent 
behind repeal of section 791 was to extend application of the Espionage Act to cover acts 
committed anywhere in the world."). I am focusing here only on the Espionage Act. It is possible 
that the government might also seek to prosecute under computer fraud or other laws. 
159. See John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya, British Court Denies Bail to Assange, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/europe/08assange.html (noting that both 
Sweden and Britain, where Assange was being held at the time of this writing, have extradition 
treaties with the U.S., but that extradition rulings may be appealed to the European Court of 
Human Rights). 
160. Id. 
161. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 109 (1996) (noting that 
under a "mutuality of obligation" approach to constitutional domain, "aliens are within the 
sphere either when they are within the nation's territory or on specific occasions when the nation 
attempts to exact obedience to its laws"). 
162. Cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1990) (refusing to apply 
the Fourth Amendment to the search of an alien's home abroad, even though the alien had been 
brought to the United States and was subject to its laws there, because the alien had no other 
connection to the United States); id. at 276-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the 
defendant was entitled to at least some constitutional protections by virtue of his involuntary 
presence in the United States); id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the defendant 
was entitled to Fourth Amendment protections even though he was involuntarily within the 
United States); id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens 
should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and 
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the question would be whether the government could prosecute 
Assange and WikiLeaks for possessing and/or disseminating 
confidential government materials. 
Such a prosecution would be unprecedented. The United States 
has never prosecuted anyone other than a government employee, 
under the Espionage Act or other law, for merely receiving or 
disseminating confidential information. It is true that in New York 
Times u. United States ("Pentagon Papers Case'), 163 which focused 
primarily on whether the government could impose a prior restraint 
on the publication of potentially harmful information, some of the 
Justices noted that Congress appeared to have authorized prosecution 
of recipients and disseminators. 164 However, neither in that case, nor 
in any since, has the government actually prosecuted a journalist or 
other recipient of confidential information. 
It is questionable whether such a prosecution would be 
consistent with the First Amendment's free speech and free press 
guarantees. Indeed, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested that in 
the absence of some form of active participation in informational theft 
or other wrongdoing, the recipient of information of public concern 
cannot be prosecuted for publishing it "absent a need of the highest 
order."165 The Court has reasoned that if the legal sanctions applicable 
to leaking do not provide sufficient deterrence, then "perhaps those 
sanctions should be made more severe."166 The Court has also 
observed that "it would be quite remarkable to hold" that an 
punish them."). Perhaps a key distinction between Verdugo-Urquidez and Assange's potential 
prosecution might be the fact that, in Verdugo-Urquidez, the alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation took place abroad, while any First Amendment violation would occur at the moment of 
Assange's indictment and prosecution within the United States. See id. at 264 ("For purposes of 
this case, therefore, if there were a constitutional violation, it occurred solely in Mexico."). 
163. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
164. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 736-39 (White, J., concurring); id. at 745 
(Marshall, J., concurring). 
165. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001). The government might argue that as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, the Espionage Act makes knowing dissemination of 
confidential materials a criminal offense and that Assange's sharing of information with the 
press was a criminal offense. See United States v. Morrison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 660 (D. Md. 1985) 
(holding that 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)-(e) applies to individuals who leak classified material to the 
press, because the recipients are "not entitled to receive [the classified material}"); see also 
POSNER, supra note 74, at 109 ("[S]ince the Espionage Act does punish the communication of 
material relating to national defense ... that could be used to injure the nation ... publication of 
such material ... would seem ... to violate the act .... ") (emphasis added). As noted below, 
however, that theory would seem to apply with equal measure to press outlets such as The New 
York Times and The Washington Post. The government might also argue that Assange entered a 
conspiracy with Private Manning, who allegedly stole the government information, by providing 
him with certain forms of assistance in disseminating the files. Prosecution for this sort of 
criminal conduct would not raise serious First Amendment questions. 
166. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. 
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individual can be constitutionally punished for merely disseminating 
information because the government failed to "deter conduct by a non-
law-abiding third party."I67 
These sentiments are clearly premised on the idea that 
prosecution of information distributors will stifle or restrict the free 
flow of information of public concern. Of course, the First 
Amendment's protection of information distribution is not absolute. 
For example, the government can restrain certain harmful or deadly 
disclosures in adV-ance of publication. 168 Some might argue that 
Assange and WikiLeaks are not entitled to any First Amendment 
protection owing to the potential harm that they caused by 
disseminating wartime logs and diplomatic cables. However, thus far 
the logs and cables do not appear to constitute the kind of "crime-
facilitating'' speech that lies outside of the First Amendment's 
domain.l69 Nor is it clear that the disclosures will, as Justice Stewart 
stated in the Pentagon Papers Case, "surely result in direct, 
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."170 
Further, whatever one. might think of the tactics Assange and 
WikiLeaks used, the information thus far disclosed has shed 
invaluable light on important matters of global public concern.l71 The 
mere fact that the disclosures might harm the national interest is 
itself not a sufficient ground for prosecution, particularly where the 
disclosures relate to matters of such clear public concern. 172 
Even if the United States could obtain custody of Assange and 
overcome these strong First Amendment objections to prosecution, 
there are several reasons why the government should not pursue this 
167. Id. at 529-30; see also New York Times, 403 U.S. at 729-30 (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the responsibility for ensuring confidentiality rests with the executive). 
168. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("No one would question 
but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the 
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops."). 
169. Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1217-18 (2005). 
170. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 728, 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Government Secrecy v. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 185, 203-04 (2007) 
(arguing that to justify punishing the press for publishing confidential information, the 
government must prove that the publisher knew that the information was confidential, that 
publication would result in imminent and serious harm, and that publication would not 
meaningfully contribute to public debate). The government has largely downplayed the 
significance of the disclosures. See The Defense Department's Response, supra note 36 (noting 
that the period covered in certain reports "has been well chronicled in news stories, books and 
films .... "). 
171. The information regarding foreign diplomacy has shed light on pressing domestic and 
international concerns. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Reports Detail 
Iran's Aid for Iraqi Militias, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/ 
worldlmiddleeast/23iran.!J.tml. 
172. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 718-20; id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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route. Insofar as any prosecution would be based primarily upon 
knowing receipt and publication of confidential information, there 
would be little to distinguish the New York Times from WikiLeaks. 
Thus, the damage to the functioning of the domestic press from the 
threat of prosecution for mere dissemination of confidential 
information could be substantial. Newspapers and other media might 
be reluctant to report government secrets, even if they had no original 
role in obtaining the information. If Assange is prosecuted as a 
criminal conspirator, then members of the domestic press will have to 
consider whether that theory applies to them as well. Government 
whistleblowers might also be reluctant to come forward under these 
circumstances. In sum, any short-term gain in terms of retribution or 
deterrence could have long-term negative consequences for 
governmental transparency and the free flow of information on 
significant matters of public concern. 
The prosecution of Assange and WikiLeaks could also make the 
U.S. government look ineffectual and weak in the eyes of foreign 
regimes and international audiences. Worse, it may send conflicting 
signals regarding the government's regard for the free flow of 
information on the Internet. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has 
announced an "Internet Freedom" initiative, which touts the use of 
new technologies to facilitate information sharing and democracy 
across the globe.l73 At the same time that the United States is 
praising hackers who resist repressive regimes abroad, its government 
would be seeking to prosecute an alien who used new technologies to 
expose government secrets. If the Department of Justice pursues this 
course of action in the WikiLeaks case or in some similar case, U.S. 
credibility on Internet freedom, governmental transparency, and the 
free transborder flow of information could be significantly 
compromised. 
Of course, the United States may well lose the case. Win or 
lose, however, none of this effort and expense will change the fact that 
the war logs and cables have been distributed and discussed across 
the globe and now cannot be fully retrieved. This does not leave the 
United States defenseless against a rogue publisher operating 
thousands of miles away. Rather than pursue the recipients and 
publishers, the government ought to ensure that its own controls and 
safeguards respecting confidential information are substantively 
adequate and are actually being enforced. 
173. Internet Freedom, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb 
/cip/netfreedom/index.htm#hr (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (describing the State Department's 
Internet Freedom initiative). 
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE GLOBAL THEATER 
As Part II showed, in the global theater, potentially harmful 
expression will pose some unique First Amendment concerns. Recent 
episodes involving the Koran-burning pastor, the cartoonist-in-hiding, 
the cross-border associate of foreign terrorists, the rogue citizen-cleric 
living abroad, and the foreign-information distributor also reveal some 
broader lessons regarding freedom of speech, association, and press in 
the global theater. 
First, as the global theater continues to develop, we will need 
to pay more attention to, and develop a more coherent sense of, the 
First Amendment's important transborder dimension. Second, as the 
examples discussed in Part II showed, certain traditional First 
Amendment justifications, including marketplace of ideas and self-
governance principles, will retain their importance and ought to 
continue to operate in the emerging global theater. However, as the 
global theater develops and expands, Americans will be called upon to 
explain and defend some of our exceptional free speech protections. 
Third, freedom of the press, broadly defined, will play a critical role in 
the emerging global theater. Changes with respect to the identity, 
functions, and ethics of the press will significantly affect global 
information flow. Finally, speakers and distributors of information 
will face a new set of threats to transborder information flow in the 
global theater, including softer forms of governmental persuasion and 
regulatory power, restrictions by private intermediaries, and 
extrajudicial (or, perhaps, extralegal) forms of punishment for 
potentially harmful expression. 
A. The First Amendment's Transborder Dimension 
In the global theater, a narrowly territorial or provincial 
orientation with respect to the First Amendment will not help us 
identify and resolve the most pressing twentieth-century problems 
concerning global information flowY4 Today, expression, association, 
and information routinely cross and transcend territorial borders. As 
noted earlier, traditional concepts such as proximity and incitement 
must be adapted to a global theater shaped by characteristics of 
interconnectivity and compression.175 
174. See generally Zick, supra note 130, at 949-98 (describing and critiquing provincial 
conceptions of the First Amendment). 
175. See Bell, supra note 14, at 1027-28; Volokh, supra note 14, at 1341-42; Zick, supra note 
68, at 34-36. 
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In this environment, we can no longer view the First 
Amendment as constituting a narrow set of restrictions on domestic 
governance. This is especially true when the effects of incendiary 
domestic communication may be felt half a world away; when foreign 
hecklers can chill speech in domestic marketplaces; when speakers 
can engage in real-time interactions with audiences without regard to 
location; and when publishers can disseminate potentially harmful 
information, including government secrets, from places well beyond 
the practical and perhaps even the legal domain of the affected 
government. In the global theater, we will need to expand the focus 
regarding the First Amendment beyond its domestic aspects and 
effects. To do so, we will need a conceptual and constitutional 
framework for analyzing disputes that fall within the First 
Amendment's transborder dimension. 
This critical dimension will implicate a number of free speech 
and association rights relating to transborder information flow. These 
include the rights of citizens to (1) receive information from foreign 
sources;176 (2) engage in expressive activities beyond U.S. territorial 
borders;177 (3) forge lawful relationships with aliens located abroad;178 
(4) collaborate with alien persons or groups in lawful and peaceful 
endeavors, including information dissemination;179 and (5) engage in 
robust cross-border exchange and dialogue.l80 
The Supreme Court has not embraced these First Amendment 
liberties to nearly the same extent as their domestic counterparts, and 
policymakers have historically discounted their importance. 181 
However, these are the foundational liberties supporting twenty-first 
century, transborder information flow. As such, they will play an 
important role in shaping the application of First Amendment 
doctrines in the global theater. 
As Jack Balkin has argued, federal regulatory policies and 
decisions will be critical to the future development of digitally 
interconnected global-communication networks.182 Thus, much of the 
work to be done in developing the global theater's infrastructure will 
176. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305-Q7 (1965). 
177. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-Q9 (1981). 
178. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 760, 768-69 (1972). 
179. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987). 
180. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765 (recognizing a First Amendment right to meet face-to-
face with aliens). 
181. See Zick, supra note 130, at 982-87 (discussing judicial "quasi-recognition" of various 
transborder liberties). 
182. Balkin, supra note 19, at 428 (claiming that with regard to freedom of expression in the 
digital age, "knowledge and information policy" concerns will displace constitutional ones). 
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take place in the political branches and through the work of federal 
regulatory agencies. In certain respects, government officials and 
regulators have already begun to embrace the core precepts of a more 
globally oriented First Amendment. For example, the State 
Department recently touted Internet freedom and global information 
flow as explicit U.S. foreign affairs policies. 183 However, transborder 
issues will ultimately come to the courts as well. Thus, it will be 
critically important for judges to recognize and incorporate the First 
Amendment's transborder dimension into their analyses of global-
theater free speech, association, and press issues. 
For example, although the expressive and associational activity 
in Humanitarian Law Project crossed international borders, none of 
the Justices even mentioned any of the precedents relating to 
transborder First Amendment liberties. It is true that much of the 
speech at issue in Humanitarian Law Project was purely domestic in 
nature-namely, legal training in the United States, filing petitions at 
the United Nations, and petitioning Congress. Further, the speakers 
were all U.S. citizens who possessed First Amendment rights of their 
own. However, the fact that their audiences and associates were 
foreign individuals and entities appears to have substantially 
influenced the Court's analysis and the outcome of the case. Indeed, 
the majority made clear that its analysis with respect to speech 
directed to foreign terrorist organizations did not necessarily apply to 
domestic terrorist organizations.184 
But why should this necessarily be the case? It is not clear why 
the Court's fungibility and legitimacy rationales would not apply with 
full force to speech directed to potentially dangerous domestic groups, 
audiences, and associates. 185 Providing material support to 
homegrown terrorist organizations would seem to be equally, if not 
more, troubling given the proximity of the potential wrongdoers to 
American citizens, assets, and institutions. Perhaps the Court was 
signaling that there is something akin to a foreign affairs exception to 
the First Amendment's free speech and association protections. 
However, such an exception would be flatly inconsistent with the 
transborder liberties that the Court has already recognized. Other 
than positing a possible distinction between foreign and domestic 
organizations, the Court never acknowledged that the citizens' First 
Amendment claims had any transborder element or dimension at all. 
183. See Internet Freedom, supra note 173. 
184. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). 
185. See supra notes 108--25 and accompanying text (discussing fungibility and legitimacy 
rationales as applied to speech coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations). 
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Similarly, the dissenters failed to note that the dispute implicated 
fundamental First Amendment rights to enter relationships with 
foreign persons and entities. As a result, in Humanitarian Law 
Project, the Court missed an important opportunity to discuss and 
clarify the First Amendment's transborder dimension. Specifically, it 
failed to fully acknowledge the importance of the speech and 
association at issue to the transborder flow of information and 
transborder expressive association. 
The First Amendment's transborder dimension will be much 
more difficult to ignore in any prosecution of WikiLeaks or other 
foreign-information distributors. Whether or not Julian Assange 
possesses speech or press rights, it is clear that his substantial 
American audience does. Thus, the First Amendment issues in such a 
case are much broader than whether a foreign national can invoke the 
speech or press protections of the First Amendment, or whether some 
fine distinction can be drawn between WikiLeaks and The New York 
Times. Any prosecution would directly implicate the developing 
transborder marketplace of ideas. Regardless of the outcome, such a 
case would likely have a profound effect on transborder information 
flow and the development of the First Amendment's trans border 
dimension. 
In sum, courts and executive officials must act with awareness 
that the right to distribute information has a transborder dimension. 
In the global theater, transborder speech, association, and press 
claims will likely proliferate. In this environment, the provincial or 
narrowly democratic conception of the First Amendment, which is 
defined exclusively with reference to U.S. territorial borders, will be 
increasingly anachronistic. 186 In the years to come, courts and officials 
will face important decisions regarding the contours of the First 
Amendment's transborder dimension. As I have argued elsewhere, 
U.S. officials ought to adopt a more outward-looking, cosmopolitan 
orientation with respect to First Amendment liberties_IB7 
B. Fundamental First Amendment Values in the Global Theater 
Despite the extraordinary changes in our expressive 
environment, we must not lose sight of certain core, traditional First 
Amendment principles. In the global theater, we ought to maintain 
our fundamental commitments to counterspeech, speaker autonomy, 
186. See Zick, supra note 130, at 949-82 (describing precedents which adopt a provincial 
orientation regarding the First Amendment). 
187. Id. at 998-1022. 
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and self-governance. However, we may have to reconsider the scope, 
geographically and conceptually, of those commitments. In light of 
interconnectivity and compression, we will have many opportunities to 
consider, explain, and defend First Amendment free speech values to 
diverse global audiences. 
One of the principal lessons from early conflicts in the global 
theater is that reliance upon traditional First Amendment principles 
will be critical to preserving domestic speech rights as well as 
encouraging and facilitating robust cross-border exchange. As 
Humanitarian Law Project demonstrates, the First Amendment 
values and principles that support limits on prosecutions for 
incitement and treason remain important in the emerging global 
theater. Traditional marketplace principles, including preferences for 
counterspeech and social control over government regulation, must 
retain their vitality in the global theater. 
As we have seen, the need for tolerance regarding offensive and 
intentionally provocative speech will take on global significance. 188 
Moreover, as explained earlier, First Amendment doctrine does not 
currently allow officials to suppress offensive speech merely because it 
might have some indeterminate psychological or other negative impact 
on some audience-wherever that audience happens to be located. 189 
That does not render officials powerless to respond to offensive and 
potentially incendiary transborder speech. Officials can and should 
continue to use new technologies to counter extremist speech in the 
global theater.190 In an era in which speech and association frequently 
traverse or transcend territorial borders, justifications for expressive 
freedom ought to take into account broader concerns regarding global 
information flow, cross-border collaboration, and the global spread of 
"democratic culture."191 Granting robust protection to transborder 
speech, association, and information distribution would serve a 
number of traditional free speech values, including the facilitation of 
citizen self-governance, truth seeking, speaker autonomy, and 
checking governmental abuses of power wherever they occur. 192 
188. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 10-11 (1988) (positing a 
tolerance justification for freedom of speech). 
189. See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text (discussing free speech principles relating 
to offensive expression). 
190. See Thorn Shanker & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Uses Cyberspace to Rebut Messages Posted by 
Extremists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, at AS. 
191. See Balkin, supra note 19, at 2-6, 34-38 (explaining how transborder expressive 
activity furthers democratic values). 
192. See Zick, supra note 130, at 999-1004 (discussing First Amendment values in the 
emerging global theater). 
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Further, transborder expression and association expose citizens to 
persons, information, problems, and debates beyond their local 
communities; expand opportunities for citizens' engagement and 
participation in global affairs and humanitarian projects; foster 
diverse channels of communication, which may generate mutual 
understanding and respect; and create processes which may foster 
worldwide respect for First Amendment values. These values are 
rarely, if ever, discussed in judicial precedents or academic 
commentary concerning transborder First Amendment issues. 
Adopting this more expansive orientation with regard to the 
First Amendment places the expressive activities of the Koran burner, 
cartoonist, human-rights advocate, citizen inciting violence from 
abroad, and foreign publisher in proper perspective. 193 In general, 
Americans are no longer merely speaking to and associating with one 
another in the confines of local, state, or national communities. 
Sometimes intentionally and sometimes not, citizens are increasingly 
involved in a robust transborder marketplace of ideas. That 
marketplace is less homogenous than its domestic counterparts. 
Further, First Amendment transparency and other self-governance 
concerns extend to extraterritorial wars, intelligence operations 
conducted abroad, and foreign diplomacy. 
In many ways, we are now simply re-experiencing the growing 
pains that attended the birth of the domestic marketplace of ideas. 
Our commitment to core First Amendment free speech, association, 
and press guarantees will be severely tested in the global theater. As 
that theater develops, we will have many opportunities to explain and 
defend America's exceptional commitments to such principles, often to 
a deeply skeptical global community. Indeed, an important part of 
transborder dialogue will involve explaining marketplace, self-
actualization, self-governance, and tolerance principles to those who 
do not share or fully understand them (including, unfortunately, some 
people in the United States).194 The emergence of the global theater 
has highlighted the extent to which First Amendment doctrines and 
principles deviate from European and other international 
193. See generally id. at 948-49 (discussing the need for a more cosmopolitan view of 
transnational First Amendment rights). 
194. In response to media inquiries from domestic and foreign news organizations regarding 
Pastor Jones, the Koran burner, I was frequently asked to explain why the First Amendment 
generally forbids the government from restricting even deeply offensive expression based solely 
on its content. With regard to some of the uninformed domestic commentary on the Koran 
burning, see sources cited supra note 48. 
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standards. 195 For example, unlike many other democratic nations, the 
United States values speaker autonomy over equality and dignitary 
interests. 196 In the global theater, these differences, and the tensions 
they sometimes create, will become a more prominent concern. 
As we move deeper into the twenty-first century, First 
Amendment norms and principles will compete against other 
expressive systems across the globe. We ought to view this competition 
as an opportunity, rather than as a burden or as an occasion for 
nationalistic defensiveness. It is a salutary thing that Americans 
reflect upon and debate the balance that has been struck under our 
First Amendment. As the Koran burning demonstrates, however, if 
indeed we are intent on retaining it, we will have to do a much better 
job of explaining our First Amendment exceptionalism to diverse 
global audiences. 
C. Freedom of the Press in the Global Theater 
In the global theater, the press will play a central role in the 
transborder dissemination of information and will lead global 
dialogues on a variety of pressing issues with transborder salience. 
The press will face a variety of unique challenges in this emerging 
theater. 197 One preliminary challenge is definitional (i.e., who or what 
is a member of the "press"?). Members of the emerging global press 
will have to report responsibly on topics of global concern. They will 
confront professional and ethical concerns in their relationships with 
distant and unfamiliar information sources. Finally, the global press 
may face potential liability for disclosure of governmental secrets. 
In the global theater, the press will continue to face 
fundamental identity issues. Bloggers have already staked a claim to 
the press mantle in the digital era. 198 New types of global information 
intermediaries and outlets like WikiLeaks may also seek refuge under 
195. See generally RONALD J. KROTOSZVNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, at xiv 
(2006) (discussing the different global conceptions of freedom of speech). 
196. See id. at 90-92 (summarizing the differing approaches of Canada and Germany). 
197. For an excellent account of some of the challenges facing the press in a global society, 
see LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 6 (2010). 
198. Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal Need Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 395, 399 (2006); Joseph S. Alonzo, Note, Restoring the Ideal 
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the First Amendment's press protections. 199 In addition to the 
constitutional issues discussed earlier, 200 these identity claims will 
create professional tensions. For example, mainstream media outlets 
in the United States, some of whom have benefited substantially from 
the WikiLeaks disclosures in terms of their own reporting, supported a 
provision of a proposed federal law that would preclude organizations 
like WikiLeaks from claiming press protection regarding the identity 
of confidential sources. 201 
Mainstream press outlets must carefully consider whether it is 
wise to codify a definition of "journalist" or "press" that closely tracks 
domestic norms and practices. Traditional press outlets may gain 
some short-term advantage if global competitors are excluded from 
such definitions-as would be the case if a much-desired federal shield 
law for reporters passed.202 However, limiting protections for new 
global information intermediaries that do not function in traditional 
ways could produce long-term disadvantages in terms of access to 
governmental secrets and transborder information flow more 
generally. As transborder information flow becomes more critical to 
self-governance, transparency, and other First Amendment values, the 
domestic press ought to start thinking more globally and less 
provincially about its roles and functions. 
As reporting and other communications transcend territorial 
borders, the domestic press will also face new challenges with regard 
to reporting on matters of global concern. One challenge is to ensure 
that the domestic press devotes adequate resources to coverage of 
international events and concerns. 203 Owing to the pressures (largely 
financial) currently facing the press, this may require additional 
infusions of public funding for pres_s. activity abroad.204 
Reporting on sensitive matters of global concern will be 
another challenge for journalists operating in the global theater. 
Religion-in particular, ideas and opinions regarding Islam-will be 
one such concern. In the global theater, common language will not 
always be enough to bridge national, cultural, and religious divides. 
199. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (noting the difficulty of defining the 
category of newsmen entitled to privilege). 
200. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text. 
201. Douglas Lee, Trying to Exclude WikiLeaks from Shield Law Stinks, FIRST AMENDMENT 
CENTER (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=23303. 
202. See Paul Farhi, Wikileaks is Barrier to Shield Arguments, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 
2010, at C1 (discussing how WikiLeaks affected legislation that would protect journalists from 
being forced to reveal confidential sources). 
203. See BOLLINGER, supra note 188, at 132-36 (noting funding and other challenges 
affecting the international presence of the domestic press). 
204. ld. 
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Journalists are uniquely positioned to play an educational role in the 
global theater. A more knowledgeable and responsible press can 
encourage and facilitate respectful debate on sensitive matters, like 
religion, that reach across deep cultural divides. In order to serve this 
important function, however, reporting on religion and other 
important global concerns must be as factual and neutral as possible. 
For example, many journalists simply erred in referring to the 
proposed Islamic center in lower Manhattan as the "Ground Zero 
Mosque."205 The label is both factually inaccurate and incendiary. To 
face the challenge of reporting on such matters in the global theater, 
journalists may need to improve their substantive training with 
regard to transborder religious and cultural issues. In the global 
theater, journalists will need to think more globally in terms of 
audiences and cultures. 
Another challenge facing the domestic press in the emerging 
global theater relates to the sorts of relationships it will enter into 
with private and governmental sources of information. The 
whistleblower of yesterday (e.g., Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon 
Papers Case) may be replaced by information intermediaries with 
uncertain credentials and agendas (e.g., Julian Assange and 
WikiLeaks). This new breed of intermediary may be thousands of 
miles away and subject to the laws of foreign nations. It may be a 
private venture or a foreign government, or a foreign government 
masquerading as a private venture. In the emerging global theater, 
journalists may need to reassess standards of journalistic ethics and 
responsibility relating to their relationships with sources. The press 
may need to hold some sources at arm's length. It may need to 
scrutinize information with greater care, particularly when the source 
appears to be suspect and the information may potentially be 
damaging to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.206 
As the WikiLeaks episode shows, the press may be exposed to 
greater criminal liability as a result of cooperating or collaborating 
with foreign sources, persons, and organizations. As discussed earlier, 
if history is any guide, the likelihood of a criminal prosecution of the 
domestic press for merely disclosing information of public concern 
appears to be rather slim.207 Nevertheless, some of the theories that 
officials are currently considering in connection with possible 
205. See sources cited supra note 24 (discussing the inaccurate labeling of the Manhattan 
mosque). 
206. See ArthurS. Brisbane, Sharing Secrets at Arm's Length, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at 
WK-8 (discussing the relationship between WikiLeaks and The New York Times). 
207. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. 
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prosecution of Assange and WikiLeaks leave little breathing space 
between these actors and the domestic press.208 Even if the 
government were able to split hairs in a manner that relieves the 
domestic press of criminal liability, the resulting uncertainty could 
chill future reporting regarding governmental secrets. 
Moreover, in the emerging global theater, the threat of 
criminal liability is not limited to contexts in which individuals 
disclose confidential government information. The domestic press 
must also be mindful that any relationship or collaboration with 
foreign terrorists or foreign-terrorist organizations could give rise to 
criminal charges of "material support" or criminal conspiracy. Under 
the reasoning of Humanitarian Law Project, a domestic editorial 
board that makes print space available to a foreign terrorist may be 
accused of providing "material support" to terrorists. The resulting 
fear of criminal liability may interrupt or chill the free flow of 
information in the global theater. 
In sum, the press will be a critical transborder conduit of 
information on matters of global concern. In the global theater, the 
press will face identity, professional, and liability challenges. It ought 
to face those challenges mindful of the globalization of the profession 
and the unique characteristics of the theater in which it now operates. 
D. New Threats to First Amendment Freedoms 
Finally, in the global theater speakers and publishers will face 
new threats to freedom of speech and the transborder dissemination of 
information. Only some of these will emanate from the state, as in the 
case of potential criminal charges against information distributors like 
WikiLeaks. Other restrictions will arise from the conduct of nonstate 
actors, including information intermediaries. Moreover, the global 
theater may give rise to unique rule of law concerns regarding access 
to judicial process for speakers located abroad. 209 
In the global theater, speakers and publishers will continue to 
face the usual challenges in terms of governmental restrictions, 
regulations, and prosecutions. Authorities may be able to effectively 
regulate some transborder and extraterritorial expression by pursuing 
208. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text. Domestic journalists are not the only 
ones who face potential difficulties as a result of disclosure of confidential information. 
Government employees may face penalties for viewing still-classified documents. Even job-
seekers who post comments on the documents may face repercussions when they apply for 
sensitive federal positions. 
209. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi). 
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domestic intermediaries such as internet service providers. 210 The 
First Amendment implications of prosecuting WikiLeaks are critically 
important.211 However, we ought to be focusing more on the power of 
nonstate actors to affect global information flow, and the power of 
government actors to engage in various forms of "soft'' censorship.212 
An expanding category of intermediaries will likely become 
targets of governmental pressure. For example, in an effort to restrict 
or suppress some potentially harmful speech, officials may seek to 
pressure intermediaries such as YouTube, Amazon, and PayPal to 
deny service to certain speakers or publishers. Indeed, in the case of 
WikiLeaks, U.S. officials initially pressed social networking and 
financial intermediaries to deny service to the website in an effort to 
shut it down or at least slow the release of confidential information.213 
These efforts were only marginally successful. It quickly became clear 
that WikiLeaks had allies in the global information network. The 
federal government's denial of service strategy precipitated a small-
scale information war. Various hackers attacked social networking 
and financial intermediaries, including through distributed denial of 
service attacks.214 In the global theater, efforts by government officials 
to lean on information intermediaries will likely lead to new forms of 
cybercivil disobedience and information activism in locations across 
the globe. Moreover, information distributors like WikiLeaks possess 
and will likely distribute encrypted flies of their caches, which can 
then be released at different points in the interconnected global 
network.215 Thus, regardless of the actions officials may take, the 
information itself will likely remain available for distribution. 
However, unlike WikiLeaks, few speakers or publishers are 
likely to have a global support network. This may render their 
210. See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 18, at 68-79 (discussing regulation of information 
intermediaries). 
211. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text. 
212. With regard to methods of "soft" censorship of Internet speech, see generally Derek E. 
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(Dec. 2, 2010), http:l/news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_thecutline/20101202/tc_yblog_thecutlinellieberman-
pressures-amazon-to-drop-wikileaks; see also Bambauer, supra note 212, at 27-34 (discussing 
efforts to censor WikiLeaks through persuasion and pressure). 
214. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, The Oldest Hack in the Book, SLATE (Dec. 9, 2010, 5:46 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2010/12/the_oldest_hack_in_the_book.html 
(discussing WikiLeaks supporters' attempts to deny Internet service to Visa.com and 
MasterCard.com); David Sarno, 'Hactivists' Fight for Their Cause Online, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
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(discussing hackers' attempts to deny Internet service to Visa.com). 
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communications more vulnerable to private restrictions, which 
government officials may play a role in imposing through soft forms of 
persuasion.216 Owing to their private status, the decisions and policies 
of intermediaries, such as You Tube and Amazon, are not subject to 
legal or constitutional constraints. In the global theater, private 
censorship may become an increasingly prevalent and effective 
obstacle to transborder information flow. 217 If this occurs, arguments 
in favor of reconsidering or abolishing the traditional public-private 
distinction in free speech and other contexts may gain additional 
force. 218 
Finally, more general rule-of-law and freedom-of-speech 
concerns will arise in the global theater. The most serious of these will 
relate to speakers who reside beyond the territorial borders of the 
United States. Citizens, who likely possess at least some First 
Amendment rights abroad, may be subjected to new forms of summary 
punishment.219 The killing of the U.S.-Yemeni cleric Al-Aulaqi is an 
example.22o It may well be that Al-Aulaqi engaged in treasonous or 
other illegal conduct. However, targeted killing obviously takes the 
matter away from the courts without any legal determination to that 
effect. Under such circumstances, we cannot be certain whether the 
speaker is being punished for protected speech or criminal conduct. In 
many cases, the public may not even be aware that targeted killing 
orders have been issued. 
To be sure, courts may be ill-equipped to decide the underlying 
merits of such orders. Still, there ought at least to be some check on 
the government's ability to order the killing of a citizen based in part, 
if not substantially, upon his protected expression. The characteristics 
216. See John F. Burns & Miguel Helft, Under Pressure, You Tube Withdraws Muslim Cleric's 
Videos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A16 (discussing how YouTube removed videos under 
pressure from American and British officials); Ravi Somaiya, U.S. Islamic Web Site Is Taken 
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at A5 (discussing an extremist Islamic website that was taken 
down). 
217. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet 
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 14 (2006) (discussing 
how regulation of intermediaries allows the government to control speech over the Internet). 
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219. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (assuming citizens have free speech rights 
abroad). 
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of the emerging global theater may actually offer at least a partial 
solution to the rule-of-law and justiciability problems associated with 
the extraterritorial targeted killing of citizens. In its decision 
dismissing Al-Aulaqi's father's lawsuit, the district court suggested 
that Al-Aulaqi himself might have been permitted to appear via 
teleconference to contest the order, rather than enter the United 
States and risk certain arrest and detention. 221 Although 
teleconferencing would not resolve all justiciability issues that might 
arise in such cases and may not be an optimal forum for adjudicating 
these matters, it would provide the citizen target with an opportunity 
to appear in a U.S. court. Virtual process would at least allow the 
target of an execution order to contest the legal and factual validity of 
the order, as well as to raise any free speech claims. 
In general, we ought to begin thinking about how best to 
balance the rule-of-law and First Amendment concerns in such cases 
with the need to protect national security. The answer may lie in 
considering whether targeted killings are consistent with fundamental 
norms of international law.222 Whatever may be the source of free 
speech rights for citizens, and even aliens, abroad, virtual or even 
remote forms of legal process for speakers would be preferable to 
extrajudicial, and perhaps illegal, execution orders. 
CONCLUSION 
Potentially harmful domestic, expressive activities increasingly 
have transborder effects. In the global theater, increased 
interconnectivity and the compression of space and time will enhance 
speakers' ability to communicate offensive and incendiary messages 
and to enter associations with disfavored and potentially dangerous 
foreign organizations. Further, the distribution of government secrets 
and confidential information may affect foreign audiences, foreign 
affairs, and other nondomestic U.S. interests. 
This Article addresses the First Amendment implications of 
speakers falsely shouting fire in the global theater. The fact that such 
speech reaches a worldwide audience certainly requires that speakers 
and officials be aware of potential transborder effects, including 
violent reactions in foreign nations and potential effects on foreign 
221. Al·Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 n.4 (D.D.C. 2010). 
222. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution 
Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 231 (2010) (discussing the extent of the Constitution's 
jurisdiction); Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial 
Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 309 (2011) (arguing decisions regarding extraterritorial 
actions should be based on fundamental norms of jurisprudence). 
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diplomacy. However, it does not require the courts to revise traditional 
doctrines relating to offensive, incendiary, inciting, and other forms of 
potentially harmful expression. As the examples discussed in this 
Article show, traditional First Amendment doctrines and principles 
can adequately accommodate potentially harmful speech in the global 
theater. Moreover, in general, traditional First Amendment 
justifications ought to apply with full force to transborder expression 
that offends, upsets, or otherwise affects foreign audiences. 
We should also to resist the temptation to react to potential 
foreign threats or effects by creating new limits on transborder speech, 
association, and press activities. This includes new forms of guilt by 
association, cybertreason, and new limits on global press freedoms. 
Indeed, applying long-standing First Amendment principles and 
protections with full force to domestic expression that has potentially 
harmful transborder effects will serve to underscore a national 
commitment to robust and exceptional free speech, association, and 
press rights. 
There are also more general lessons to draw from the global-
theater speech, association, and press controversies highlighted in this 
Article. We need a more systematic and coherent understanding of the 
First Amendment's transborder dimension. As the global theater 
develops, rights to exchange information across borders, to speak to 
and associate with aliens abroad, and to engage in expressive 
activities beyond U.S. borders will become increasingly important. As 
this occurs, courts, elected officials, agency personnel, speakers, and 
members of the press ought to consider adopting a more cosmopolitan 
orientation with regard to the First Amendment and its 
justifications.223 The press, in particular, will be critical to robust 
transborder information flow. As the global theater emerges, 
journalists will need to address fundamental identity, professional, 
ethical, and legal issues in a manner that preserves their core 
functions. Finally, in the global theater speakers, journalists, and 
other information providers will face new regulatory challenges, such 
as the denial of access and service by private information and 
financial intermediaries, informal governmental pressure, and 
extrajudicial punishments. As the First Amendment enters the second 
decade of the twenty-first century, we ought to be thinking more 
carefully and systematically about the implications of these and other 
limits on transborder information flow. 
223. See generally Zick, supra note 130, at 948--49 (arguing in favor of a cosmopolitan 
conception of the First Amendment). 
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